A Brief Refutation of Physicalism (Part 2)
I ended the first part of this brief series by asking the question: “Are there things which are true of mental states/properties which are not true of physical states/properties?”
The answer is yes. Physical states or properties may be described in terms of size, shape, electrical charge and spatial location. Mental states or properties do not have size, shape, or spatial location. For example, What size is the thought of pecan pie? What shape is the desire to drink water? If we apply Leibniz’s law, therefore, mental states are not identical to physical states.
Likewise, mental states (e.g., thoughts) can be true or false, whereas physical states cannot. Similarly, sensations can be pleasurable, whereas physical states cannot.
A blind neuroscientist can have exhaustive knowledge of the neurophysiology of seeing color, as well as the physics of light. Does she know everything there is to know about color perception? Most would agree that she does not. She does not know what the color red actually looks like. Suppose she suddenly gained ability to see, would she learn something new about perceiving the color red? Obviously, yes.
A related example was made famous by philosopher Thomas Nagel when he asked, “What is it like to be a bat?” One could have complete knowledge of the biology and physiology of bats, but one would not know something about the bat, that is, exactly what it is like to be a bat. The first-person awareness of being a bat is not capable of being described in physical terms.
The above arguments, in addition to others not mentioned here demonstrate that consciousness, or mind, is not identical to physical states or properties. A scientist can know much more about my brain than I do, but he cannot have more knowledge of my thoughts, emotions, and beliefs than I do. The mind is not identical to the brain.
Next, a few words about intentionality.
