withallyourmind.net

There is and has been an ongoing effort to attempt to explain away belief in God as purely naturalistic, physicalistic, and/or evolutionary phenomenon which has no basis in reality. We believe in God because we were somehow “wired” to do so. It seems efforts have become more fervent and feverish over the past few years. Al Mohler, in his post Is Belief in God Just a Natural Phenomenon?, explores new efforts by…

a group of scientists, armed with a multi-million-dollar budget, are working together in this effort, known as “Explaining Religion.” The magazine (The Economist) explains that “Explaining Religion” is “the largest-ever scientific study of the subject. It began last September, will run for three years, and involves scholars from 14 universities and a range of disciplines from psychology to economics. And it is merely the latest manifestation of a growing tendency for science to poke its nose into the God business.”

Will this program to explain belief in God from a materialist or naturalist standpoint succeed? There is no other choice. Mohler notes:

Well, in one sense this is just made necessary by the intellectual commitments of those who believe that everything must have a natural explanation. On this question, those committed to naturalism and materialism have nowhere to look but the human brain and its biochochemistry.

Mohler’s post reminded me of lectures I’ve attended of philosopher Michael Murray on studies in cognitive psychology which attempt to undermine justification for belief in God. An excellent examination of four arguments offered by naturalistic cognitive psychologists to explain away belief in God are examined and addressed in the paper, Four Arguments that the Cognitive Psychology of Religion Undermines the Justification of Religious Belief. Murray sets up the discussion with a few preliminary comments, among which are:

Do these contemporary cognitive models of religion show us that religious beliefs are nothing but “a trick fobbed off on us by our genes?” Our first reaction to such a question should be: well if they do, it is not clear how. These models, if correct, show not one thing more than that we have certain mental tools (perhaps selected for, perhaps spandrels) which under certain conditions give rise to beliefs in the existence of entities which tend to rally religious commitments. But pointing that out does nothing to tell us about whether those beliefs are justified or not. After all, we have mental tools which, under certain conditions, give rise to belief in the existence of palm trees and electrons. We don’t regard those belief forming mechanisms as unreliable, nor (typically) the beliefs formed as unjustified.

Both Mohler and Murray make for interesting reading.