The Complexity of the Designer
I received an email a few weeks ago from Marc who asked if I would be willing to answer two main points which ID critics cite when attempting to label ID as unscientific. Today, I’ll take a look at one of the two, that is, “Isn’t ID internally inconsistent because it invokes the existence of something even more complex to explain the complexity of life on earth?” This is an objection that Dawkins refers to in his book The God Delusion. No explanatory advance is made in such a case as now one would be left with an even more complex entity needing explanation.
William Lane Craig addresses this issue in his evaluation of the Dawkins’ central argument of his book which can be found here. Here are a couple of take home points in answering this objection.
First of all, this objection cannot be fully answered without considering how one is to weigh competing explanations for a phenomenon. This is not a simple question and has been the subject of much philosophical reflection. It is implied in this objection that simplicity is the most important criteria. However, there are other important criteria which must be weighed, such as, explanatory power, explanatory scope, and so on.
Second, if one grants that simplicity is the most important criteria in this case, the objection contains a fatal flaw in its assumption that a divine designer (I must interject that ID as a scientific endeavor does not identify the designer as a divine being, but many understand the designer to be divine, and the objection implies the designer is divine.) is an equally complex or more complex entity than the universe. Craig states:
As an unembodied mind, God is a remarkably simple entity. As a non-physical entity, a mind is not composed of parts, and its salient properties, like self-consciousness, rationality, and volition, are essential to it. In contrast to the contingent and variegated universe with all its inexplicable quantities and constants, a divine mind is startlingly simple. Certainly such a mind may have complex ideas—it may be thinking, for example, of the infinitesimal calculus—, but the mind itself is a remarkably simple entity.
So, this objection confuses a mind’s ideas, which may be complex, with a mind itself, which is a simple entity. Therefore, the objection fails since an advance in simplicity is acheived by positing a divine mind.