On Objective Beauty
John Mark Reynolds, at Scriptorium, has a series of posts called, “What My Nana Taught Me” examining the question of whether beauty is objective or subjective, that is, “Does beauty reside in the object itself?” or, “Is beauty merely in the eye of the beholder?” Most Christians readily embrace the concepts of objective truth and objective morality, but have not consistently applied that view to beauty. Reynolds argues that beauty is objective, as is truth and goodness. There are five posts at this time, and I’m not sure if he will be adding to these.
I think he a good argument that at least makes the objectivity of beauty reasonable. He presents two “suggestive facts” which argue for objective beauty. The first is the almost universal reaction to extreme ugliness and extreme beauty around us. The second is the teaching of Scripture on the subject. Scripture certainly does seem to imply that beauty is something more than a subjective sensation in the beholder.
Reynolds does concede that one major problem with holding to the objectivity of beauty is the difficultly one has in defining precisely what beauty is. He rightly notes, however, that there are many things which are difficult to define which we still hold to be objectively the case.
Here is an excerpt from one of the posts:
Christians should be careful. Our relativism about beauty and art is exactly like secular relativism about morality. When we tolerate cheesy religious art, because the message is good, then the message may be helping us while the art kills us.
When speaking at a secular college, the same reaction comes when I suggest that some moral standards are “absolute” and not just made up by people. Unlike their secular peers, Christian students have no problem with objective morality or with the existence of truth (at least in theory). These were good kids and serious Christians.
But beauty? Beauty was something they choose. It makes them mad to imagine losing this freedom in just the same way their secular peers are angered at the thought of losing moral autonomy.
The comparison should concern them, as it began to concern me. If I create my own morality, then it has no meaning outside of me. My moral standards cost nothing to create, but are worth nothing to others. In the same way, if I am totally free to choose what is beautiful, my choices will be meaningless to anyone but me. This feels wrong in both morality and aesthetics. Real morality cannot be just “about me and my needs.” I often act morally for the good of others. Beauty that only I can understand is lonely. Something beautiful that I can share, because of a common standard of beauty, makes another beautiful thing: the communion of two people looking at one beautiful thing.