A Moral Atheist?

Filed under: Apologetics — Barry Carey at 4:21 am on Thursday, September 4, 2008

A recent post on this site commented on the oxymoronic nature of the phrase, “A Catholic for abortion.” Is the phrase, “A moral atheist” equally oxymoronic. Can atheists be moral? I think the obvious answer is yes. There is nothing contradictory about a person living a moral lifestyle and yet not believe in God. I am certain there are many atheists who live moral lives. The important question is not whether or not an athiest can be moral, but is there any grounding for that morality. Tom Gilson, at Thinking Christian has been discussing that question in a couple of recent blog posts. I don’t think morality can be grounded if there is no God.

An important question which needs to be answered is - Exactly what do we mean when we say that a thing (like morality) is grounded. Tom has an excellent explanation of this concept which I’ll reproduce here:

An answer to the question, “I don’t believe D moral duty or value applies to me, and I want you to tell me why I should. You might have some instrumental or pragmatic reasons for me to practice D, or you may tell me D is ‘what we customarily do in our culture,’ but I don’t know why D should be considered good in itself, or why I should take it on as a value or duty of my own.”

A proper ground for morals would be something that, if true and if understood by the subject (the questioner, in this case) to be true, would provide sufficient reason for the subject to change his or her mind about the goodness of the behavior, value, or duty in question. It would explain how said behavior, value or duty actually is good in itself; not merely instrumental, pragmatic, or customary.

It would do so by reference to some condition of reality that can bear the weight placed upon it. For example, if it is suggested that D is good because it contributes to reproductive fitness, then reproductive fitness’s goodness would have to be good in itself (or based on something else that is good in itself).

Yes, there are moral atheists. But if there is no God, morality has no grounding.

4 Comments »

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Comment by BK

September 6, 2008 @ 9:47 am

The problem with the phrase “a moral atheist” (as opposed to “amoral atheist” — a much more common phenomenon) is that it only looks at half of the picture. Certainly, an atheist can be moral with respect to his or her actions. When they help the needy or protect the innocent, they are acting morally. But Jesus pointed out that morality is not simply a matter of actions, but of thought and motive. If I act morally but have an immoral intention, am I really being moral?

BTW, my play on words, above, raises a different way of looking at the question: can there be such a thing as a true Christian who is an amoral person? Is there such a thing as an atheist who is an amoral person? The first is oxymoronic while the second is perfectly acceptable within the world view of atheism.

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Comment by TL

September 7, 2008 @ 12:45 am

In response to three excerpts from the essay you quoted:

but I don’t know why D should be considered good in itself, or why I should take it on as a value or duty of my own.

These are two different things–indeed, they are nearly opposites! I would say that no actions are good “in themselves” (i.e. without reason, or regardless of reason). However, there may be plenty of reasons to accept actions as values and duties.

A proper ground for morals would…explain how said behavior, value or duty actually is good in itself; not merely instrumental, pragmatic, or customary.

I disagree. I think instrumental, pragmatic, and customary behavior is a fine ground for morals. Actions are good because they do something good for someone. What is added by saying the moral is good “in itself”? What could that possibly mean?

…if it is suggested that D is good because it contributes to reproductive fitness, then reproductive fitness’s goodness would have to be good in itself (or based on something else that is good in itself).

Reproductive fitness is a good terminus as far as scientific justifications are concerned. It may not support most moral judgments–but that’s not to say morality doesn’t have termini of its own!

On the other hand, the principle of natural selection can well explain why we are predisposed to believe that certain behavior is laudable. Loyalty and sacrifice for one’s blood relatives or social group is clearly conducive to passing on the family genes; the ability to feel similar compassion for outsiders might be just a byproduct of the need to love members of our own group. That’s how kindness arose, biologically. That’s how and why our minds work the way they do. Whether we choose to foster our innate ability to love and respect people who are different from us is a moral question, and we can set up love or peace as a moral terminus, simply because love and peace somehow feels right to most of us (at least, it feels better than the alternative!) and has instrumental value.

Why do we need to posit goodness as good-in-itself? Sounds like an infinite regression of goodness to me.

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Comment by BK

September 8, 2008 @ 2:40 pm

On the other hand, the principle of natural selection can well explain why we are predisposed to believe that certain behavior is laudable. Loyalty and sacrifice for one’s blood relatives or social group is clearly conducive to passing on the family genes . . . .

I always find this line of argument fascinating. Originally, the idea was that survival of the fittest meant that the one who was best suited to an environment would be the one who survived. That approach failed to answer the question about sacrifice — in fact, there is no way for sacrifice to be passed along in a “selfish” environment of survival of the fittest.

So, then it became the idea of passing along “genes” as if genes think for themselves. They somehow know there are other genetic beings out there that they need to protect in some way, and that sacrificing oneself will allow those genetically similar to survive. How, exactly, does that work? Where, exactly, is the scientific test that confirms this hypothesis? Oh yeah . . . there is none.

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Comment by TL

September 11, 2008 @ 12:17 am

Scientists need a way to interpret seemingly “altruistic” behavior in animals such as, for example, ants and bees–social insects that sacrifice themselves individually to defend their group. They clearly didn’t develop this altruistic drive through religious education, and, even if you assume that the Creator made ants and bees with some kind of altruistic intuition (so that they wouldn’t require education), it isn’t likely that this intuition works on a level high enough so that it can properly be called moral.

The point is, if a theory can be developed for why certain animals have developed altruistic behavior, the same theory could probably also apply to humans.

I do not know how a hypothesis like this can be tested. I am aware, however, of an influential book that I have not yet had a chance to read: Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene (1976). This book argues that evolution works on the level of the gene, not on the organism or the population. Genes are entities devoted to self-replication. Organisms (plants, animals, humans) evolved as effective ways for particular genes to replicate. It is a truly Twilight Zone way of thinking about humanity: your body is a byproduct of your genes. From what I have read about the book, Dawkins is very explicit that the gene does not have to think or be aware of what it is doing. Therefore, it is not quite accurate to say that chickens exist for the purpose of laying eggs (since the genes have no conscious intent); rather, chickens exist simply because they do lay eggs. The evolutionary emphasis is in the transmission of genes to the next generation.

To bring it back to the level of behaviorism, if certain chicken behavior (such as not pecking out the eyes of their close relatives) causes the family genes to be more successful, more such loyal chicks will hatch (even if the original pacifist chicken is quickly eaten by a fox). A similar principle has been proposed to explain the existence of humans who have no desire to reproduce–they may direct their energy toward ensuring the success of their nieces and nephews, which is an indirect way of passing on their own genes. I honestly don’t know whether there is a scientific “test” for this theory, but the theory is internally consistent and makes a good deal of sense. To me, it makes more sense than the idea that the chickens need some transcendent moral ground for not traumatically gouging their siblings, or that childless people need to know that it is true that they should help pay their young relatives’ college tuition.

Of course, humans reflect on our naturally-motivated behavior and we try to consciously change our behavior so that it will be in accordance with our personal philosophies and our group’s expectations of us. That still doesn’t imply, to me, that we need a transcendent moral ground (whatever that is), or that we would know what to do with such a ground if it bit us in the bottom. If chickens don’t need it, why do we need it? Isn’t our advanced philosophy–our rationalizations of instrumental worth, our experiences of lived joy–enough to entertain us on a higher level? By contrast, the “good-in-itself” seems to be good for nothing.

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