A Brief Refutation of Physicalism (Part 4)

Filed under: Apologetics, Philosophy — Barry Carey at 10:47 pm on Sunday, August 3, 2008

In my previous posts, I have shown that mental properties and physical properties are not identical. This would at least establish that property dualism is true. However, there is good reason to go further and also believe that substance dualism is true. It is not just that the physical brain has two kinds of properties (property dualism), but humans possess a body and an immaterial soul which possess their respective kinds of properties.

The split-brain thought experiment illustrates that no amount of information about my body or my consciousness will tell anyone where I am. Let us suppose that person 1’s brain is split in ½, with ½ of his brain placed into a body (person 2) and the other ½ into another body (person 3). Suppose that persons 2 and 3 both have all of person 1’s memories and personality traits.

Where is person 1? It could be that person 1 was annihilated and two new people came into existence. It could be that person 1 is now person 2, and person 3 is a mental double. It could be that person 1 is now person 3, and person 2 is a mental double. It won’t work to split person 1 in half and end up with ½ persons.

The end result is that although we know where person 1’s brain and body are, we have no idea where person 1 is. Yet, if the physicalist view were correct, we would. No amount of information can answer the question of where person 1 is. So, there is more to person 1 than just his brain, body, or even personality traits, memories, and conscious life.

Next, more reasons to believe that substance dualism is true.

4 Comments »

Comment by Richard Brown

August 4, 2008 @ 7:05 am

“In my previous posts, I have shown that mental properties and physical properties are not identical.”

That’s rich! What you have shown is that you have begged the question against the physicalist. If, say, type identity theory is true then of course pains will have locations. They will be located right where the brain state is, because they are identical.

Comment by Keith

August 4, 2008 @ 10:28 am

Richard,

That’s a less than convincing argument you’ve given us. Did you not read the first line of Barry’s post? It says, “In my previous posts, I have shown that mental properties and physical properties are not identical.” This means he has given arguments for his position. Now, it may be that you reject his arguments, but that’s a much different accusation that accusing him of begging the question. Or do you simply define begging the question as disagreeing with your own position?

Besides, wouldn’t this be a more fruitful discussion if you actually engage his arguments, rather than simply showing up and asserting your position?

Comment by Keith

August 4, 2008 @ 10:29 am

(only the first usage of the word “arguments” is supposed to italicized above)

Comment by Richard Brown

August 4, 2008 @ 8:49 pm

I did engage his position. What he has said is that pains don’t have locations, but why think thatunless you already think that pains are non-physical. That’s called question beging since you assume what you are trying to prove. Just saying ‘brain states have location, pains don’t’ isn’t an argument. Neither is saying ‘mental states are about things, brain states aren’t’. What you need are arguments for those very substantial claims. If the identity theory is right then brain states are about things and pains do have locations, so why should we think this is wrong?

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