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This is the seventeenth in a series of posts summarizing and commenting on Shaun Nichols’ Teaching Company lecture series Free Will and Determinism.

David Hume, to whom I’ve referred on more than one occasion in this series, advocated a sentementalist approach to morality, that is, the morality is based in the emotions. We have the moral convictions we have because of the emotional responses we have. Our emotions drive our judgments about what is right and what is wrong. To Hume, there is no deeper justification for moral beliefs. They are not based in reason.

This approach leads to a certain view of moral responsibility. If a persons performs a heinous act, others naturally feel resentment and blame toward that person. Hume felt that concerns with determinism were irrelevant on this view:

A man who is robbed of a considerable sum; does he find his vexation for the loss anywise diminished [by] these sublime reflections [about necessity]?

Hume thinks, “No!” Emotions are a natural response to vicious acts and one needs no philosophical theory to confuse the issue.

Sir Peter Strawson (1919-2006), an English philosopher developed a similar view. He calls our emotional reactions to certain acts (e.g., resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, love) “reactive attitudes” which reflect the fact that we hold the individuals morally responsible for their actions. If I am insulted, I feel resentment. This resentment, according to Strawson, is not sensitive to whether determinism is true. He does not think we would or should give up reactive attitudes even if we came to believe in determinism.

Galen Strawson, his son, responds that the idea that responsibility is incompatible with determinism is a part of those reactive attitudes themselves. Indeterminist free will is a built in presupposition of those attitudes. Our emotional reactions are affected by reflecting on determinism. For example, suppose we hear about a ruthless murder of two children. We would be morally outraged by such a crime. Then suppose that we learn that the murderer suffered years of abuse and neglect as a child. Our moral outrage diminishes somewhat because it seems the murderer is less deserving of the blame. It certainly seems plausible that our reactive attitudes would be altered if we came to view someone’s behavior as completely determined, that they had no other choice but to commit the act in question.

I’ve been a life-long Georgia Bulldog fan (I was born and raised in Atlanta), yet I’ve never attended a Georgia football game… Until Now! On Saturday, I will be in Jacksonville, FL watching the top 10 matchup between the Dawgs and the Gators.

The Atlanta Journal Constitution website has this little diversion to get Georgia fans in the mood.

This is the sixteenth in a series of posts summarizing and commenting on Shaun Nichols’ Teaching Company lecture series Free Will and Determinism.

In my previous post, I discussed how deontological ethics depends on the idea that people have free will. If there is no free will, deontological ethics doesn’t make sense. Let us assume for a moment that there is no free will. Will utilitarianism provide an adequate ethical system?

Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory of ethics which judges the rightness or wrongness of an action based solely on its consequences. (Egoism is another consequentialist theory which holds that the right action is the one which produces the best consequences for the person making the decision.) Utilitarianism requires that one must specific what the good is (e.g., pleasure), and then define what is right in those terms. The goal is the greatest good for the greatest number. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) is one of the leading figures in the history of utilitarianism.

There is something initially compelling about utilitarianism. According to this theory, the right thing is to the action that brings about the best outcomes for the most people according to what you hold most valuable. It also doesn’t seem to depend on free will. The outcome is the only concern. One’s intentions or how the action came about is not an issue. What matters is what happened as a result of the action.

Utilitarianism, however, is not without its problems. A part of ethical theories is the question of who deserves blame and who deserves praise. According to consequentialist ethics, it seems one should be blamed if bad consequences result from the action, no matter what the intention or how it happened. This runs contrary to our common sense notion of blame and praise. The utilitarian sidesteps this issue by turning the act of blame and praise into a utilitarian tool to secure good results in the future. We blame people to prevent bad things from happening down the road. So, the traditional sense of blame and praise appears lost.

Worse yet for utilitarianism is that at times the act that produces the best overall consequences involves an action that is intuitively abhorrent. For example, suppose that a sheriff can prevent a dangerous riot in which many people might be killed by framing an innocent man. Or imagine a doctor who can save five people’s lives by harvesting the organs from a healthy ptient who came in for a checkup. Utilitarianism would have to claim that both acts were moral and this type of behavior should be encouraged.

Although utilitarianism fails as a moral theory, this does not mean that we should never consider the consequences of an action when deliberating on the proper course of action. It just means that we cannot set up an ethical theory based on consequentialism.

So, what is left for the ethicist who denies free will? Is there no alternative? Some would deny the maxim that “ought” implies “can,” but this seems to be cheating. A third ethical theory, Virtue Ethics, provides some possibilities, but it seems to me that it doesn’t ameliorate the problems created by free will skepticism.

Amanda Gefter, an editor for New Scientist, in a recent article called “Creationists Declare War over the Brain,” details a recent development in the areas of neuroscience and consciousness. This development is the increasingly common assertion by some that materialistic explanations of the mind, mental states, and consciousness have failed. Gefter is alarmed with…

… a growing “non-material neuroscience” movement. They are attempting to resurrect Cartesian dualism - the idea that brain and mind are two fundamentally different kinds of things, material and immaterial - in the hope that it will make room in science both for supernatural forces and for a soul.

She mentions Angus Menuge, author of Agents Under Fire: Materialism and the Rationality of Science, and J.P. Moreland, author of Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Arguement (their work has been discussed here previously). She quotes Patricia Churchland ’s accusation that they and others like them of arguing from ignorance:

Patricia Churchland, a philosopher of neuroscience at the University of California, San Diego, “it is an argument from ignorance. The fact something isn’t currently explained doesn’t mean it will never be explained or that we need to completely change not only our neuroscience but our physics.”

Joe Gorra, of the Evangelical Philosophical Society, has posted a response (EPS Philosophers Respond to New Scientist Article On “Creationism” and Materialism) to Gefter’s article. Both Moreland and Menuge responded. Moreland said:

The simple truth is that in both science and philosophy, strict physicalist analysis of consciousness and the self have been breaking down since the mid-1980s. The problems with physicalism have nothing directly to do with theism; they follow from rigorous treatments of consciousness and the self as we know them to be. The real problem comes in trying to explain its origin and for this problem, naturalism in general and Darwinism in particular, are useless. In my view, the only two serious contenders are theism and panpsychism which, contrary to the musings of some, has throughout the history of philosophy been correctly taken as a rival to and not a specification of naturalism.

Menuge stated…

… it is possible that a materialistic explanation of consciousness might be found, but that does not make the claim that consciousness is non-physical an argument from ignorance…

At any given time, scientists should infer the best current explanation of the available evidence, and right now, the best evidence from both neuroscience and rigorous philosophical analysis is that consciousness is not reducible to the physical. Churchland’s refusal to draw this inference is based not on evidence, but on what Karl Popper called “promissory materialism,” a reliance on the mere speculative possibility of a materialistic explanation. Since this attitude can be maintained indefinitely, it means that even if a non-materialist account is correct (and supported by overwhelming evidence), that inconvenient truth can always be ignored. Surely the project of science should be one of following the evidence wherever it leads, not of protecting a preconceived materialist philosophy. Isn’t it that philosophy—the one that constantly changes its shape to avoid engagement with troublesome evidence, either ignoring the data or simply declaring it materialistic—that most resembles a virus?

William Dembski responded to the article as well:

Witch hunts, subversion of science, not following evidence to its logical conclusion — all the things the author worries will happen to science if a non-materialist neuroscience succeeds — are the things she herself embraces in reflexively assuming that the only valid neuroscience must be materialist.

HT: Thinking Christian

It was with sadness that I recently heard of the rift between Robert H. Schulller of California’s Crystal Cathedral and the television show “Hour of Power” and his son Robert A Schuller, who had been doing most of the preaching for the past few years. It is with greater sadness that I now learn what was apparently the source of the rift. Here it is, according to this L.A. Times article:

Schuller built his worldwide ministry over a half century on the psychology of positive thinking and appealing to people turned off by the formality of traditional faiths. In contrast, his son’s sermons have been full of direct references to the Bible.

“I was called to start a mission, not a church,” Schuller told his audience Sunday. “There is a difference. . . . You don’t try to preach . . . what is sin and what isn’t sin. A mission is a place where you ask nonbelievers to come and find faith and hope and feel love. We’re a mission first, a church second.”

Al Mohler comments regarding this situation here. Positive thinking will only get one so far. He rightly points out he necessity of the true gospel, noting that…

The gospel of self-esteem is a false gospel that, like every other false gospel, breaks down under pressure.

My friend, Doug Powell, has just launched a new apologetics website called Selfless Defense. Doug is the author of The Holman QuickSource Guide to Christian Apologetics and is a contributor to The Apologetics Study Bible. He’s a smart guy and I’m sure his website will be an excellent resource for those interested in apologetics.

This is the fifteenth in a series of posts summarizing and commenting on Shaun Nichols’ Teaching Company lecture series Free Will and Determinism.

Nichol’s lecture series turns toward the impact of free will and determinism on prescriptive questions. How does free will or the lack thereof impact ethics? How does this subject impact the notion of moral responsibility? Should we hold people responsible and blame them if determinism is true? Does our justice system need a radical overhaul?

There are two major approaches to normative ethics (that branch of ethics that deals with the principles we should follow if we hope to lead a moral life): Consequentialism and Deontology. Consequentialism maintains that the moral worth of an action is entirely determined by its consequences. Utilitarianism,perhaps the most familiar form of consequentialism, holds that the best (or most moral) action is the one which brings about the best consequences for the most people. Deontoloy, on the other hand, places an emphasis on moral duties rather than consequences. To a deontologist, certain actions are wrong even if they produce the best consequences for the most people. A person’s intentions are much more important than the consequences in this view. Both views seem to have some appeal to commonsense morality.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), one of the greatest philosophers in history, is the most famous deontologist. For Kant, morality is based on our duties. It is not necessary to consider the consequences of one’s actions. For example, we have a duty not to kill an innocent person. Even if killing an innocent person might bring about certain positive consequences, it would be wrong to do so in every circumstance. He developed what is called the categorical imperative which instructs us as to the proper course of action in every situation. This imperative states that I should only act on the basis of a principle that I would have everyone act on. Kant did focus on our intentions, as well. We must perform a moral act simply because it is the moral act. This seems to require free will. If one is to be blamed for her bad intentions the person must be able to choose her intentions.

Kant argued for free will in his Critique of Practical Reason. According to Nichols, he first claims that the moral law is a fact which forces itself on us. We are all aware of this “fact of reason.” Since there is a moral law, we are obligated to behave in certain ways. Kant then invokes the principle that “ought” implies “can.” If one cannot do a certain thing, then it is unreasonable to say that he ought to do it. If determinism is true, we can only do whatever we are determined to do. It is impossible to do otherwise. Therefore, Kant concludes we must have free will. For him, deontological ethics requires free will.

One could of course turn the argument on its head and affirm that determinism is true therefore deontological ethics is false. But the point is, according to Kant, if there is a moral law which we are obligated to follow, there must be free will.

It’s hard to believe that I’ve been blogging (almost) daily for over three years now. It occurred to me last evening that our first post was in October (the 11th) of 2005. I’ve found that, at times, it is extremely difficult to blog on a daily basis. At other times, it comes easily. Anyway, thanks to all of those who read this blog and I hope that I continue to have something interesting (and helpful) to say.

This is the fourteenth in a series of posts summarizing and commenting on Shaun Nichols’ Teaching Company lecture series Free Will and Determinism.

Are we totally aware of all the factors affecting our decisions? Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson, in a paper called Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes, indicate that we do not have conscious access to all that happens in the mind leading to decisions. Various experiments were performed which support this conclusion.

In one study, people who were given a placebo and told that the pill would produce certain symptoms (symptoms, by the way, which are similar to what is felt when one feels electric shock) would tolerate more electrical shocks than those who were not given the placebo. When asked, afterwards, whether the pill had made any difference in how many shocks they endured, most said no. However, those participants who had the conscious belief that the pill was responsible for their symptoms tolerated more shocks. Their behavior was affected yet they did not recognize that their belief about the pill played a role.

In a similar study of electrical shocks, one group was told that the shocks would cause “no permanent damage.” They said that knowing this affected the number of shocks they tolerated, but the results showed no effect whatsoever. So, it seems at times people think that a certain belief played a role in their decision making when it did not. What these two studies do seem to indicate is that we are unaware of all the causes of our behavior.

Yale psychologist, John Bargh, also conducted experiments drawing similar conclusions. By exposing groups of people to certain words their behavior was changed. For example, people exposed to words associated with rudeness were more likely to interrupt the experimenter than those exposed to words associated with politeness.

Do these studies provide evidence for determinism? Some have said so. However, they fall far short of proving determinism. Certainly, they show that subtle nonconscious process influence our decisions with our realizing it. But that does not show determinism. It is perfectly consistent with libertarianism to allow that our choices are influences by factors which themselves we do not choose, yet not determined by them. Some libertarians would also hold that only some choices are genuinely free, such as moral choices.

Orson Scott Card is a Democrat. He is a bestselling American author, critic, political writer and speaker. He is also a newspaper columnist in Greensboro, NC. He has recently written a piece called, “Would the Last Honest Reporter Please Turn on the Lights.” It is an article every American should read before voting in this presidential election. After reading the article, a voter might still have reason to vote for Obama, but hopefully not for inaccuracies concerning the current economic and housing crisis. Regarding the cause for the crisis, Card has this to say:

This housing crisis didn’t come out of nowhere. It was not a vague emanation of the evil Bush administration.

It was a direct result of the political decision, back in the late 1990s, to loosen the rules of lending so that home loans would be more accessible to poor people. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were authorized to approve risky loans.

What is a risky loan? It’s a loan that the recipient is likely not to be able to repay.

The goal of this rule change was to help the poor — which especially would help members of minority groups. But how does it help these people to give them a loan that they can’t repay? They get into a house, yes, but when they can’t make the payments, they lose the house — along with their credit rating.

They end up worse off than before

Fannie Mae is a major contributor to Obama’s campaign and the former CEO of Fannie Mae, Franklin Raines, has been an advisor to Obama’s campaign. Rather than mindlessly blaming Bush, McCain and the Republicans, he provides the following:

(I)t was Senator Christopher Dodd and Congressman Barney Frank, both Democrats, who denied that there were any problems, who refused Bush administration requests to set up a regulatory agency to watch over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and who were still pushing for these agencies to go even further in promoting subprime mortgage loans almost up to the minute they failed.

As Thomas Sowell points out in a TownHall.com essay entitled Do Facts Matter? “Alan Greenspan warned them four years ago. So did the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to the President. So did Bush’s Secretary of the Treasury.”

These are facts. This financial crisis was completely preventable. The party that blocked any attempt to prevent it was … the Democratic Party. The party that tried to prevent it was … the Republican Party.

Yet when Nancy Pelosi accused the Bush administration and Republican deregulation of causing the crisis, you in the press did not hold her to account for her lie. Instead, you criticized Republicans who took offense at this lie and refused to vote for the bailout!

Cards primary audience is to the media, whose actions at this point in time he finds despicable and dishonest. To them he says:

If you had any principles, then surely right now, when the American people are set to blame President Bush and John McCain for a crisis they tried to prevent, and are actually shifting to approve of Barack Obama because of a crisis he helped cause, you would be laboring at least as hard to correct that false impression.

Your job, as journalists, is to tell the truth. That’s what you claim you do, when you accept people’s money to buy or subscribe to your paper…

… If you do not tell the truth about the Democrats — including Barack Obama — and do so with the same energy you would use if the miscreants were Republicans — then you are not journalists by any standard.

You’re just the public relations machine of the Democratic Party, and it’s time you were all fired and real journalists brought in, so that we can actually have a daily newspaper in our city.

Read the whole thing.