The Problem of Evil - Part 6
Thus far, we have considered the logical and probabilistic versions of the internal problem of evil. The external version of the argument differs in that the Christian is not admitting the truth of the premises (unlike in the internal argument). This version would claim:
1. If God exists, gratuitous evil does not exist.
2. Gratuitous evil exists.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.
The Christian would not deny that evil exists; only that gratuitous evil does not exist. The key premise is number two. So, what warrant can be offered for the premise that gratuitous evil exists? In the preceding posts, I have already shown this assertion to be faulty. It has been said that one man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens. By this we simply mean that the above argument can be flipped to state:
1. If God exists, gratuitous evil does not exist.
2. God exists.
3. Therefore, gratuitous evil does not exist.
Before addressing the emotional problem of evil in my next post, one more very important consideration must be mentioned. Moral evil actually proves the existence of God. Any argument that uses the existence of evil proves the existence of God. It can be convincingly argued:
1. If God did not exist, objective moral values could not exist.
2. Evil exists, therefore objective moral values exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.
This argument certainly does not explain why there is evil in the world, however, it does show that the existence of evil in the world, rather than disproving God’s existence, actually implies God’s existence. If one denies the existence of God, one must stop using the term evil in any meaningful sense.