The Problem of Evil - Part 4
This is the fourth post in a series examining the problem of evil. In the last post, I demonstrated that there is no logical incompatibility in the coexistence of God and evil.
What about the probabilistic problem of evil? It seems, at times, that the world is full of so much pointless and unnecessary evil that it is improbable that God could have a morally sufficient reason for allowing them. Even if it is not impossible for God to exist given the evil in the world, it is at least highly improbable. It can be seen that this argument is much more powerful than the preceding argument from logical impossibility. The burden of proof is not nearly as steep given that the conclusion is more modest. Craig, in Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, provides several responses to this probabilistic version.
His first response is that God’s existence is probable relative to the full scope of the evidence. He rightly points out that probabilities are relative to one’s background evidence. If the only evidence considered in evaluating God’s existence is evil, then perhaps God’s existence is improbable. However, there is much other background information which makes the existence of God highly probable. The cosmological argument argues that since everything that begins to exist has a cause and the universe began to exist, therefore, God exists. The teleological argument looks at the ever-increasing accumulation of evidence for design in the world and concludes there must be an intelligent designer of it all. The axiological argument examines the innate moral intuitions which all have and finds that the existence of a divine moral law-giver is necessary to make sense of morality. The fine-tuning of the universe cries out for explanation which is found in the existence of God. Additionally, other examples could be offered. The point is that when the entire scope of evidence is considered, even with evil in the world, God’s existence might still be considered highly probable.
Next, a look at a couple of more responses to this probabilisitic version of the problem of evil.