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This is the third post in a series examining the problem of evil. In my last post, I borrowed from William Lane Craig an organizational framework with which to approach this problem. Today, I’ll take a brief look at the logical problem of evil.

The logical form of the argument is that which has been espoused by atheists for centuries. The Epicurean quote considered by Hume is a formulation of this argument. The logical argument against God’s existence based on the existence of evil has been widely regarded by philosophers of religion as having been laid to rest. This is largely due to the work of Alvin Plantinga. In his work, Plantinga makes an important distinction between the terms “theodicy” and “defense.” Plantinga defines “theodicy” as the attempt to show why God actually permits evils in the world. A “defense”, however, makes no such attempt, but simply shows that the atheist’s argument is not successful. The argument, then, can be defeated and one may still have no clear answer as to why evil exists.

There is no explicit logical contradiction between the two premises:

1. An omnipotent, omnibenevolent God exists.
2. Evil exists.

For these two statements to be considered contradictory, additional premises must be provided, such as an omnipotent God could create any world that he desires and an omnibenevolent God would desire a world without evil. However, neither of these additional premises is obviously true. Perhaps there are worlds which are logically impossible to create; for even God could not do that which is logically impossible (e.g., creating a round square).

Plantinga proposed the free will defense to oppose the problem of evil. In it he argues that if God grants genuine freedom to his creatures to do as they wish, He cannot guarantee that that person will make the proper choice. Every possible world may contain creatures that freely choose to do evil. Natural evil may also be accounted for the actions of free demonic beings. While this may seem improbable to some, it surely deflects the objection that evil and God’s existence are logically incompatible.

It is equally possible that an omnibenevolent God might have some reason for desiring a world with evil rather than one without evil. A parent may sometimes allow some pain and suffering in a child’s life to bring about some greater good. Similarly, God might have some morally sufficient reason to allow pain and suffering in the world. Consequently, it is clear that neither additional premise is necessarily true, and the logical argument for denying God’s existence fails. To refute the logical problem of evil, the theist must only suggest a possible solution, not a probable or plausible one. To prove that God and evil are logically incompatible, the atheist must show that God could have no morally sufficient reason for permitting evil in the world.

Next, the probabalistic version.