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It seems our prayers are most often filled with thanksgiving and requests for things like food, jobs, health, safety and many other things which are not, in themselves, wrong for which to pray. It is quite enlightening to note, however, what dominated the requests of the New Testament writer, Paul. Perhaps, our prayer lives need a little remodeling and adjusting.

In Ephesians, Paul prayed…

… that the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory, may give you a spirit of wisdom and of revelation in the knowledge of him, having the eyes of your hearts enlightened, that you may know what is the hope to which he has called you, what are the riches of his glorious inheritance in the saints, and what is the immeasurable greatness of his power toward us who believe. (Eph 1:17-19 ESV)

… that according to the riches of his glory he may grant you to be strengthened with power through his Spirit in your inner being, so that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith–that you, being rooted and grounded in love, may have strength to comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge, that you may be filled with all the fullness of God. (Eph 3:16-19 ESV)

In Philippians, Paul prayed…

… that your love may abound more and more, with knowledge and all discernment, so that you may approve what is excellent, and so be pure and blameless for the day of Christ, filled with the fruit of righteousness that comes through Jesus Christ, to the glory and praise of God. (Phil 1:9-11 ESV)

In Colossians, Paul prayed…

… that you may be filled with the knowledge of his will in all spiritual wisdom and understanding, so as to walk in a manner worthy of the Lord, fully pleasing to him, bearing fruit in every good work and increasing in the knowledge of God. May you be strengthened with all power, according to his glorious might, for all endurance and patience with joy, giving thanks[d] to the Father, who has qualified you[e] to share in the inheritance of the saints in light. (Col 1:9-12 ESV)

For the Thessalonians, Paul prayed…

… may the Lord make you increase and abound in love for one another and for all, as we do for you, so that he may establish your hearts blameless in holiness before our God and Father, at the coming of our Lord Jesus with all his saints. (I Thess 3:12-13 ESV)

… that our God may make you worthy of his calling and may fulfill every resolve for good and every work of faith by his power, so that the name of our Lord Jesus may be glorified in you, and you in him, according to the grace of our God and the Lord Jesus Christ. (II Thess 1:11-12 ESV)

In Philemon, Paul prayed…

… that the sharing of your faith may become effective for the full knowledge of every good thing that is in us for the sake of Christ. (Philemon 1:6 ESV)

William Lane Craig, in Five Views on Apologetics, raises an interesting point in his response to evidentialist, Gary Habermas. The context in which he makes this statement is a discussion of the evidential significance of miracles for the Christian faith.

Scientists claim that we cannot allow supernatural explanations in our study of the universe. This stance is called methodological naturalism, a commitment to allow only natural explanations for observed phenomenon. This is to be contrasted with philosophical or metaphysical naturalism, which claims that “nature” is all there is.

Methodological naturalism is not limited to science. Historians, as well, have a commitment to methodological naturalism. The supernatural is ruled out a priori as an explanation for events. Thus, miracles are not historical events. The resurrection could not have occurred. Only natural explanations are allowed. Now, here is what Craig says which caught my attention:

Similarly, natural theologians who argue inductively must confront in science the same obstacle as Christian evidentialists do in hisotry, namely, methodological naturalism. It is frequently asserted that the professional scientist or historian is methodologically committed to seeking only natural causes as explanations of their respective data, which procedure rules out inference to God as the best explanation. It is puzzling that some methodological naturalists in science, such as Howard Van Till with his doctrine of the “functional integrity” of creation, nevertheless want to dismiss methodological naturalism when it comes to history and to affirm the historicity of the gospel miracles. One cannot, it seems to me, have it both ways. (emphasis mine)

It seems to me, also, that there is an inconsistency in those who hold that we must honor science’s commitment to methodological naturalism while rejecting the historian’s. The natural theologian, as Craig points out, is often labeled with a “God of the gaps” label for his insistence in allowing supernatural explanations. What difference is there in the historian who appeals to supernatural explanations for events? Craig claims:

The problem is exactly parallel: what justifies us in inferring from the failure of naturalistic explanations of the data a miraculous explanation?

To be consistent, it seems those Christians who insist on methodological naturalism in science would also insist on it in history. Of course, I am not stating that we should yield to the claims of methodological naturalism in either case. The goal of science and history should be to arrive at the best explanation. Excluding possible explanations at the outset may blind one to the truth.

William Lane Craig, in his reply to one of the other contributors in the book, Five Views on Apologetics, claims that postmodernism is a movement which receives far more credit than it deserves. Craig is not the only scholar I’ve heard which has made similar observations. Contrary to the belief of some, we do not live in postmodern times, asserts Craig.

Rather we live in post-Christian times, and what has replaced Christianity is not postmodernism but rather what has been aptly called “the new absolutism.” Today the absolute values of openness and tolerance are cherished and even demanded. Nor do most people, including academics, think that there is no objective truth. No one uses a postmodernist hermeneutic when reading the label of a medicine bodel. Theologians tend to think that postmodern pluralism and relativism are all the rage, when in fact such thinking is largely confined to the literature, social sciences, and religious departments at universities.

Feinberg, the cumulative case apologist, observed that postmodernism fails primarily due to the fact that it is unlivable. Despite denying a number of commonsense notions, they live, speak, and act in line with those notions. Craig takes this a step further. Not only is postmodernism unlivable, but it is self-referentially incoherent.

That is to say, if it is true, then it is false. Thus, one need not say a word or raise an objection to refute it; it is quite literally self-refuting…If postmodernist claims are objectively true, then those claims are themselves the mere products of social forces and so are not objectively true. Of course, if postmodernsit claims are not objectively true, then they are jsut the arbitrary opinions of certain people that we are free to ignore. Postmodernism is thus an attempt to cut the feet from under one’s opponents without having to engage one’s opponents’ arguments, a strategy that is ultimately self-refuting.

Over the past couple of weeks, I have written several blogs summarizing the different apologetics methodologies provided in Five Views on Apologetics. Here’s the link for each:

Doing Apologetics (Intro)
Classical Apologetics
Evidentialist Apologetics
Cumulative Case Apologetics
Presuppositional Apologetics
Reformed Epistemology Apologetics

It is now the moment of truth when I must declare my own preference. Here it is…. I am a classical, evidentialist, reformed, presuppositional, cumulative case apologist! As one of the contributors said, apologetics is “person variable.” I think that a wise apologist will use whatever method he deems will most likely be effective in each particular situation. The approaches are not necessarily exclusive. In fact I was repeatedly impressed at the degree of agreement confessed by each apologist. For example, Habermas said:

Much in Craig’s essay is to be commended, and many features are shared by evidentialists.

Paul Feinberg’s approach could be considered as a subspecies in the camp of evidentialist methodology… We have some differences, but these are rarely substantial.

In these areas, I embrace many of Frame’s thoughts, some of which he shares with other apologetic systems.

Not only did the replies of Bill Craig, John Frame, and Paul Feinberg not raise a single major issue, but they were largely complimentary, often augmenting my own arguments

Feinberg said:

I am in substantial agreement with what (Habermas) has to say… the cumulative case approach that I have advocated could be seen as an extension or modification of what is called the evidentialist approach.

Frame said:

In my view, not a great deal of difference exists between the methods of William Craig, Gary Habermas, and Paul Feinberg.

Presuppositionalism may be understood as a cumulative case approach that recognizes the problem of epistemic normativity.

I see considerable common ground between presuppositional apologetics and the other schools of thought represented by this volume.

Clark said:

I could have written William Craig’s essay… There is very little in Craig’s essay that I or any other Reformed epistemologist could disagree with.

What Frame and I write about how to do apologetics probably does not differ very much.

Paul Feinberg seems to agree with or concede most of the major claims of my essay.

Craig said:

(The editor) winds up with a presuppostitionalist who argues like an evidentialist and an evidentialist who endorses belief in Christian theism on the basis of the testimony of the Holy Spirit apart from evidence!

(Habermas) had better include me, too (as an evidentialist)… Gary Habermas and I seem to agree on virtually everything!

I find myself largely in agreement with the conclusion of my former teacher and old friend Paul Feinberg.

John Frame thinks of presuppositionalism as a version of Reformed Epistemology.

I am happy to say that John Frame and I do not seem to have any substantive disagreements.

The above might be a little overkill, however, the voluminous statements of agreement do support the fact that these views on apologetic methodology are not mutually exclusive. I do not mean to give the reader of this post the false impression that there were no areas of disagreement (one will have to read the book for all of that). However, I do not think it is misguided to think of one’s self as an apologist who is able to use classical, evidentialist, cumulative case, presuppostional, and/or reformed arguments effectively in the task of giving a rational defense for the Christian faith.

In this post, I provide a brief summary of the apologetic methodology known as Reformed Epistemology Apologetics. In Five Views on Apologetics, this approach is defended by Kelly James Clark. Reformed epistemology holds the position that belief in God does not require the support of evidence or argument in order for it to be rational. Alvin Plantinga, one of the most important Christian philosophers of today, is a defender of this approach. While not completely discounting the importance of evidence in our knowing certain things, there are some beliefs which may be rational without evidence.

Clark maintains that we hold many beliefs to be true without evidence. For example, we believe that there are other persons without evidence. It is difficult to “prove” that other persons exist. Much of our knowledge is not based on evidence, but on what others have told us. Most of us know that Paraguay exists, but how many have actually have evidence that it does. How do we know that we were not created five minutes ago with our memories intact? How do we know what we had for breakfast this morning? On the basis of what evidence?

Clark presents at least three reasons why it is rational for a person to accept belief in God without the need for argument:

1. There are very few people who have access to or the ability to assess most theistic arguments.
2. It seems that God has given us an awareness of himself that is not dependent on theistic arguments. John Calvin spoke of the sensus divinitatus. People are accountable to God, not because of a failure of submisstion to a theistic proof, but because they have suppressed the truth God has placed within them.
3. Belief in God is more like belief in a person than belief in a scientific theory.

Reformed epistemology does not maintain that a person cannot come to God through arguments and evidences. It merely maintains that arguments and evidences are not necessary for one to be rational in one’s belief in God. To state the central point of Reformed epistemology in a sentence:

Rational people may rationally believe in God without evidence or argument.

According to Plantinga’s theory of warrant for beliefs…

A belief is warranted if it is produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties in circumstances to which those faculties are designed to apply.

Belief in God is felt to be a properly basic belief. The Reformed epistemologist argues that our cognitive faculties do indeed produce such a belief which properly functioning in the right circumstances. I conclude with Clark’s conclusion:

It is often calimed that Reformed epistemology endorses belief in God without proof or evidence; there is a sense in which that claim is true, but it is surely an exaggeration… Belief in God can be based on reason or on the evidence of religious experience. But experience of God need not be the basis of a warranted belief in God. One’s properly functioning cognitive faculties can produce belief in God in the appropriate circumstances with or without argument, evidence, or religious experience.

I hope, next, to offer my take on the five views on apologetics.

I’ve been discussing apologetic approaches over the last several posts. Here’s one approach I’m not sure holds much water.

The next apologetic strategy discussed in Five Views on Apologetics is the Presuppositional approach espoused by John M. Frame. Frame’s presuppositional approach differs in many important aspects from that of some other presuppositionalists, including Cornelius Van Til. Frame begins his discussion by talking about biblical empistemology (theory of knowledge). Our fundamental presupposition must be that God’s words are true. Therefore, scripture is the ultimate criterion of truth.

Frame rejects theological rationalism, that is, that reason is ultimate. Instead, he argues that faith governs reason. Only when one has accepted the presupposition of God’s revelation as truth can he know the truth. Only when our rational faculties have been submitted to God can they function properly. Although Frame did not claim this, some presuppositionalists claim that the unbeliever can have no knowledge at all. As Frame puts is:

Unbelief distorts human thought.

Frame lists several points which should be noted in dealing with an unbeliever to accept Christian presuppositions:

1. Faith is a demand of God.
2. The apologetic argument based on biblical presuppositions conveys truth.
3. God made all humans to think with the Christian-theistic worldview as their presupposition.
4. Knowledge suppressed creates contradiction in thought and life.
5. The apologist should require the unbeliever to reason on Christian presuppositions.

He further makes the following points regarding apologetic method:

1. The goal of apologetics is to evoke or strengthen faith, not merely to bring intellectual persuasion.
2. Apologists must resist temptations to contentiousness or arrogance.
3. Apologists should present God as he really is: as sovereign Lord of heaven and earth.
4. Our argument should be transcendental (I think this is the most important point Frame makes):

It should present the biblical God, not merely as the conclusion to an argument, but as the one who makes the argument possible. We should present him as the source of all meaningful communication, since he is the author of all order, truth, beauty, goodness, logical validity, and empirical fact.

5. Many traditional arguments (e.g., cosmological argument) can be used to reach this transcendental conclusion.
6. Nothing should be said to the unbeliever to reinforce his pretense to autonomy or neutrality.
7. The actual arguments used will vary. Apologetics is “person variable.”
8. It is useful to show how the errors of non-Christian worldviews arise from religious rebellion, not merely logical mistakes or factual inaccuracy.

So, in conclusion, the presuppostional approach focuses on the presuppostions we all hold and argue that only the Christian presupposition provides a basis for true knowledge. It challenges the unbeliever to look at the world through the worldview of Christianity and see if it doesn’t make sense.

The last apologetic approach to be examined is “reformed epistemology.”

The third methodology which is employed in doing apologetics has been termed “cumulative case” apologetics. Paul D. Feinberg, in Five Views on Apologetics, makes the case for this particular method being the best. He claims that, unlike some other apologetic methods, the goal of the cumulative case approach does not attempt to provide demonstrably sound arguments, i.e., those which have premises which can be shown to be true and are logically valid which are coercive by their rational power.

Feinberg feels a better strategy is to build a probable case for the truth of theism and Christianity. This case is the cumulative case approach which he considers to be a type of inference to the best explanation. He explains:

The model for defending Christianity is not to be found in the domain of philosophy or logic, but law, history, and literature.

He explains his description of this approach as follows:

1. The argument for theism and Christianity is an informal one, not a formal one.
2. It is a broadly based argument drawn from a number of elements in our experience.
3. No single element in the argument has priority over any other. One is presenting a number of elements in no particular order and claiming that the Christian theist explanation makes the most sense of all the evidence available.
4. It is not simply a case for theism, but for Christianity. It establishes the Christian worldview. The theory that best accounts for the data is to be preferred.

In evaluating which worldview better accounts for the data, one must decide between competing truth claims. To do so, one must employ the following tests for truth (These tests for truth, by the way, ar not unique to cumulative case apologetics, but have been recognized by philosophers for a long time. I might also add that they are not all equally accepted as valid tests for truth):

1. The Test of Consistency: Is the system of belief internally consistent or does it lead to a contradiction?
2. The Test of Correspondence: Does it correspond with reality?
3. The Test of Comprehensiveness: Does it explain more of the evidence than other competing claims?
4. The Test of Simplicity: The simplest explanation is to be preferred.
5. The Test of Livability: Can one live consistently with his belief system?
6. The Test of Frutifulness: Does the belief system have fruitful consequences?
7. the Test of Conservation: The explanation which requires the least radical revision of our view of the world is preferred.

In conclusion, Feinberg claims that the best case for Christianity will be a broad-based one with many subjective and objective elements. It is like a lawyer’s brief which hopes to show that Christian theism is the most plausible explanation of all the evidence. Feinberg does not provide a sketch of what arguments he might include in his cumulative case for Christian theism, but one assumes he would include many the arguments made by classical apologists and evidentialists.

Next time… Presuppositional apologetics. I hope to share some of my own thoughts about these various views at the end of my summaries of each approach.

I’ve been out of town for a few days and will soon resume the series on apologetic methodology. However, for today, another pertinent Calvin and Hobbes strip:

Pragmatist Philosopher Richard Rorty died on June 8 with pancreatic cancer. William Vallicella at Maverick Philosopher has a nicely-done, brief post on his death. He quotes Thomas Aquinas in the context of how one who disagrees with Rorty’s philosophical conclusions should view the man and his death:

We should love both: those whose opinion we follow, and those whose opinion we reject. For both have applied themselves to the quest for the truth, and both have helped us in it.