Postmodernism, Knowledge, and the Correspondence Theory of Truth

Filed under: Philosophy — Barry Carey at 3:58 pm on Thursday, June 22, 2006

Continuing a discussion of what postmodernism entails, it rejects the correspondence theory of truth, the notion that the truth of a proposition is a function of its correspondence with the “external” world, i.e., reality. One might also call this the classical theory of truth, since it was held by virtually everyone until the nineteenth century. As such, it is also the orthodox Christian view of truth. Truth, if it exists at all for the postmodernist, is relative to a linguistic community that shares the same narrative. Dichotomous thinking is also rejected. By this we mean the division of phenomonema into two groups, e.g., good/bad, true/false, real/unreal, beautiful/ugly. Assertions that use these terms are held to be relative to diverse groups of people. To claim that one is better than the other is meaningless outside of a group with a shared language, narrative, and culture because all such divisions are social constructions.

Also, rejected is the idea of universal, transcultural standards for determining whether a belief is true or false. There is no predefined rationality. The laws of logic, for example, or principles of inductive inference, are not universally valid. Rationality is held to be subjective in the sense that no one approaches life in a totally objective way without bias. Because there is no neutral standpoint from which to view the world, observations and beliefs are constructions that relect one’s own worldview. Knowledge itself is a construction of one’s social and linguistic structures, not a justified, truthful representation of reality.

Postmodernism rejects foundationalism as theory of epistemic justification. Briefly, foundationalism asserts that some beliefs are basic and do not need justification by other beliefs. All knowledge rests on the foundation of these properly basic beliefs. One example of properly basic beliefs might be the aforementioned laws of logic. One can simply “see” that if A is taller than B, and B is taller than C, then A is taller than C.

5 Comments »

1978

Comment by Kevin Winters

June 22, 2006 @ 6:28 pm

Speaking of those I am familiar with, I know that Heidegger does not reject the correspondence view of truth, though he does severely question exactly how a proposition corresponds to a thing (something that correspondence proponents have never adequately addressed). He does, however, argue for a more fundamental notion of truth, one that is not found in propositions and which even makes propositions and correspondence itself possible. He grounds the correspondence view of truth in a more primordial truth.

On the issue of dichotomous thinking, I’m not so sure about your generalization. If anything, so-called postmodernists (for the record, I think the term should just be given up as it now is meaningless) simply allow for more shades of grey than some might think, not the complete abolition of all values or value judgments. Reality is messy, not nicely categorized. But then, as with everything, we would need to look at things on a case-by-case basis rather than relying on such vague generalities.

The universality of logic is doubted because, quite frankly, thinking constitutes a very small portion of what we as humans do. Those who seek to ontologize logic are simply making it more ubiquitous than it is (i.e. not very). Furthermore, there is little reason to assume that the metaphysic inherent in (and circularly supported by) logic is correct, namely the substance-property metaphysic. It has been the bedrock of traditional metaphysics for so long that it is simply accepted as ‘obvious’ or ‘common sense,’ forgetting the cultural basis for such ‘common sense.’ As a culture we are so primed to see things in those terms, as we wish to be ’scientific,’ that we hardly know how to think otherwise (though we, of necessity, do so on a daily basis, or else we couldn’t do such simple things as driving a car or opening a door).

Furthermore, anyone who might have found a new way to talk about things is deemed illogical because they reject what others think are obvious: naturally, if one assumes that logic is supreme then anything contrary to that (unfounded) assumption would be ‘illogical’ by definition. Any notion of pre-logical or perhaps extra-logical aren’t even options as, of course, these need to be grounded logically to be believed (such language-centered notions have always surprised me; I just can’t see it). Add to this the fact that not even logicians can decide on “universal, transcultural standards for determining whether a belief is true or false,” and you can at least partially see why we aren’t satisfied with the traditional account: its foundational claims are not themselves demonstrated and thus they are without a foundation.

On the last, one reason I reject foundationalism, or “properly basic beliefs,” is because there has not been any successful accounts for demonstrating what those beliefs are. You must admit it is quite comical when people stringently (even heatedly) argue for “properly basic beliefs” but are unable to agree on what those beliefs are (I guess they aren’t that basic?), or people argue for foundationalism but have such divergent ideas on exactly what that foundation is that they end up squabbling among themselves even more than they squabble with those who disagree with them. As far as my own supposed postmodern views go, I don’t agree with foundationalism because I don’t think it is ‘beliefs all the way down’ and have never been given a reason to think otherwise.

Sorry, Barry, but so far your descriptions of postmodernism have just been too ’surface level’ to be useful; you’re simply perpetuating the same flawed generalizations as one can find on practically any Evangelical apologetic webpage without any chance for refinement. If I attempted to discuss even one of your points, from a Heideggerian perspective, I wouldn’t even know where to start: the issues are so vaguely put. So-called postmodern thought has deeper issues with the picture of modernity than its propositions or beliefs; it delves directly into its most cherished and unquestioned assumptions and values, such as the inner/outer distinction, the hyper-rationalization of ontology, the valuation of ‘objectivity,’ etc. My post might help you to see that, if you don’t mind giving it a read.

The views that so-called postmodernists are championing are much more refined than your generalities allow. It’s like trying to summarize Plato in one paragraph (no more than 150 words): on one level useful, but really only for someone who is already familiar with Plato’s thought. Of course, here we are dealing with more than one figure, also remembering that the figures within so-called postmodern camps diverge greatly on what they belief or argue. What we need is discussion on individual thinkers as generalities will never reach the essential disagreements between the two (or three or four or whatever) groups.

1983

Comment by Barry Carey

June 22, 2006 @ 8:49 pm

Kevin, You are correct in that this is a very superficial treatment of postmodernism. I’m trying to summarize in a handful of posts for those who are not acquainted with the concept of postmodernism. In doing so, I cannot spend a great deal of time on any one issue. Your input is helpful. Having said that, I disagree with several of your points above. I wish I had the time to respond to each issue. Unfortunately, I can’t seem to find the time. Perhaps, others would like to address your points.

1988

Comment by Jonathan Bartlett

June 23, 2006 @ 11:49 am

Great topic, Barry, and great post, Kevin.

I think the issue is this one:

“it rejects the correspondence theory of truth, the notion that the truth of a proposition is a function of its correspondence with the “external” world, i.e., reality”

I think the issue is that there is not a way to fully describe reality with propositions. Therefore, any proposition cannot be fully corresponded with reality. We can only apply logic to our propositions, and we base the success of this matching with how well it corresponds to the situation we are trying to apply it to.

Indeed, much of what we experience cannot properly be described with logic, so if you limit truth to logical statements you are abandoning much of reality.

I haven’t thought much about foundationalism — that would be an interesting subject indeed. Most of what I think about are symbolics. Being a programmer, much of what I do is assign symbols to things. The question is, “what can be represented by a symbol?” The answer is, “whatever the heck I want to represent”. Another question is, “how well did my symbols represent reality”. The answer to that is, “it depends on which aspect of reality my customer needed me to model”.

I think there is something that is “basic”, though I have a tough time expressing what that is. I imagine, however, that it will be something informal and common-sensical, rather than logical, simply because logic obeys common sense, not the other way around. Ultimately all science must be justified in some way to common sense, if only to be understandable when taught. So, ultimately, truth, or at least our understanding of it, is based upon principles of common sense, not logic.

You get this from reading commandments in scripture. “You shall not covet your neighbor’s house; nor his male servant, nor his female servant, nor his ox, nor his donkey, nor anything that is your neighbor’s.” This is not a logical statement, but in fact is a typological statement. It gives you a statement and examples. It does not give you a logical boundary, but rather examples of what is being talked about. This is all through scripture, and I personally think it is a much more powerful and “real” way of thinking than strict logic.

1989

Comment by Kevin Winters

June 23, 2006 @ 12:00 pm

Barry,

I just doubt how useful these are in either describing so-called postmodernism or in bringing up the essential challenges that so-called postmodernists are bringing to the table. In other words, I’m questioning the use of the summary itself, not necessarily of summaries in general. As long as we deal with such generalities what is genuinely important will be missed and the issue will be reduced to a difference in propositional affirmation. The difference is not, even on a surface reading, as simple as postmodernist affirms A and non-postmodernist affirms B. This is my real issue.

2014

Comment by teleologist

June 25, 2006 @ 4:41 am

if one assumes that logic is supreme then anything contrary to that (unfounded) assumption would be ‘illogical’ by definition. Any notion of pre-logical or perhaps extra-logical aren’t even options as, of course, these need to be grounded logically to be believed (such language-centered notions have always surprised me; I just can’t see it).

That pesky logic invariably have a way of emerging does it not?

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