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This is part 5 of a continuing evaluation of Ronald Lindsay’s support for ESCR on the basis of ethics derived from scientific naturalism.

Lindsay’s discussion of the moral implications of ESCR first looks to the possible good which may come from ESCR, and sees this as a moral imperative to pursue this type of research. He claims:

The moral imperative to pursue research with such potentially beneficial consequences seems clear. Alleviation of suffering and restoration of health are important goals even if only one individual is benefited.

If millions might be benefited the moral imperative seems more clear. While most all Americans see the alleviation of suffering as a moral act, it is not clear that this should take precedence as the overarching principle to guide biomedical research. It seems Lindsay is once again positing a utilitarian ethic as the determiner of morality. From a naturalistic perspective, this is perhaps the best one can hope for. Dennis Hollinger states:

Utilitarianism emerged in the nineteenth century as an attempt to establish the field of ethics as a scientific exercise distinct from religion or any worldview commitments. Contrasting their ethical system with the prevailing ‘principle ethics’ of the day, people like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill argued that the foundation for ethics was consequences of a particular kind: namely, the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In this formulation, ethics could actually be quantified and freed from dependence on any prior commitment to ethical norms (such as love, justice, or human dignity) or metaphysical outlooks, including religious ones.

There are several problems in basing our ethical decisions on a utilitarian foundation for ethics. First, it is not at all evident why human happiness for the greatest number of people should be regarded as the final end of human action. Based on an ethic built from scientific naturalism, what scientific experiment established this? Is this just another example of Lindsay’s own dogmatic ramblings, or does he have scientific proof for this ethic? Second, utilitarianism implies that the sought end justifies the means of achieving this end, when obviously some means to obtaining certain “good” goals are suspect. Hollinger points to Thomas Malthus’ justification of dying off large numbers of poor and hungry people for the good end of curbing population growth. Third, utilitarianism assumes objectivity in assessing the greatest good for the greatest number. This objectivity is often found lacking in reality.

Next, are embryos human persons?