Doxastic Voluntarism and a Simple Argument for Calvinism
[Disclaimer: My father does not share all of my reformed convictions so obviously any conclusions arrived at in this post are only my own. Nevertheless, I put this forward for the sake of the advance of rational discussion on both sides of the theological divide.]
John DePoe had an interesting post the other day on doxastic voluntarism, “the position that a person can willfully choose his beliefs, despite what the evidence, arguments, and other justifying reasons indicate.” I agree with him that this position is definitely false in cases such as those where we have basic beliefs (such as those arising from our senses). However, I also think that it is plausible that something like this may be true in certain circumstances. I’m not sure what I think about the example he gives, but it seems to me that at least in cases where the evidence is roughly equal for some proposition being true or false, a person could willfully choose whichever option he wished to believe.
The main reason I bring this up though is his reason for claiming that Christians should believe in some sort of doxastic voluntarism, namely, that “Christians believe there are moral consequences that follow from one’s beliefs about the existence of God, the nature of Jesus, etc. If we have no control over these type of beliefs, it seems there is no way to hold someone morally responsible for holding these beliefs.” I, too, believe that one’s religous beliefs are morally significant, and this is leads me to a simple argument for Calvinism that I’ve been thinking over recently, in the form of reductio ad absurdum. It’s a common Calvinist complaint, but I’ve never seen it in argument form.
Here is the argument in outline form, with a brief defense of the premises to follow:
(1) Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the typical Arminian doctrine of prevenient grace is true.
(2) Then the difference between a person who is saved and a person who is unsaved lies entirely in their differing beliefs about Jesus.
(3) But a person’s beliefs about Jesus are morally significant.
(4) This means a person is saved in virtue of their having performed a particular morally significant action (namely, willing to believe in Jesus in the necessary way).
(5) But the Bible says that a person is not saved because of any morally significant action they perform.
(6) Therefore, the typical Arminian doctrine of prevenient grace is false.
Defense of the premises:
(1) This is the assumption for the reductio from whence we will derive a contradiction. What I mean by prevenient grace is the belief flowing from the complete universality of the atonement that Jesus died for all men equally and then shed on all men his prevenient grace which in essence redeems their free will so that each person has all that is required in order to freely put their faith in Christ and thereby be saved. I do not intend to misrepresent here, and so far as I can tell, this is what prevenient grace entails.
(2) This premise seems to follow from the idea of prevenient grace as described above. If Christ’s atonement accomplished the forgiveness of sins equally for all men and each is given equal opportunity to freely believe on that atonement, then the difference between the saved and the unsaved is only in whether they have freely chosen to believe or not.
(3) This is what was implied in the earlier discussion of doxastic voluntarism, and it seems to fit with our moral intuitions. What could be a greater sin than pridefully rejecting the Son of God and the atonement he lovingly offers? Surely having faith is a virtue and lack of it is a vice.
(4) This follows straightforwardly from (2) and (3).
(5) This is the negation of (4), and it is derived from the straightforward reading of texts such as Eph. 2:8-9, which says that we are saved “not as a result of works,” and Titus 3:5-7, which says that God saved us “not on the basis of deeds which we have done.”
(6) This is the conclusion of the argument, the negation of the first premise on account of the contradictions which arose through its assumption.
Well…that’s the argument. I’m sure it isn’t perfect, but it looks valid and seems sound to me, although I can see certain things some would object to. I suppose looking at it now that it is more of an argument against Arminianism than for Calvinism, but I was thinking that with prevenient grace out the window some sort of Calvinist grace would fit in. (I don’t like the term irresistible because of its connotations…especially since I am a libertarian with regards to free will). If our salvation isn’t going to be based decisively on some morally significant action of our own, and having faith is a morally significant action, then it seems to me that some sort of more limited atonement will have to be posited. Then the deciding factor will not be in the will of the man, but in the extent of the atonement for the man. I don’t have time to go into all this now…but hopefully I’ll get around to spelling out my views someday (supposing I still have the same views by then ;-)).
Anyway, I’d like to know what some of you out there think about the argument. It is meant to be taken as a rational argument and it is my hope that it can be read as such in spite of the way rationality seems to go out the window whenever the Calvinist/Arminian debate is brought up.