Design Argument as an Inference to the Best Explanation
In the last post in this series exploring J. P. Moreland’s introduction to The Creation Hypothesis, we examined the design argument as an argument from analogy. I concluded by suggesting this may not be the best way to understand the design argument. “Inference to the Best Explanation” attempts to evaluate a range of phenomena and consider them as a problem to be solved. Varying hypotheses may present themselves as possible solutions to the puzzling data. Each may explain the data more or less adequately than others.
For example, let us say that I come home from work tonight and find that my 12 year old daughter’s room is meticulously cleaned. Now this is an unusual occurrence which demands an explanation. Varying competing hypotheses are considered. Perhaps, my 12 year old daugther suddenly recognized the value of cleanliness. Perhaps, an alien from a distant solar system where messiness is not tolerated entered my home and decided to tidy up (perhaps more likely than hypothesis 1). Perhaps my wife tired of her messiness and decided to clean her room. One could propose an infinite number of alternatives, some more or less plausible. Of the above, it is most likely my wife is the responsible party.
Regarding the design argument, the various features of design in our universe present themselves as puzzles that find themselves in need of explanation. Elliott Sober, a philosipher of biology and critic of intelligent design, feels Hume, who is widely heralded as the one who destroyed natural theology, did not understand Paley’s design argument as it should be understood:
Hume did not think of the design argument (as an inference to the best explanation). For him…it (was) an argument from analogy, or an inductive argument. This alternate conception of the argument makes a great deal of difference. Hume’s criticisms are quite powerful if the argument has the character he attributes to it. But if the argument is, as I maintain, an inference to the best explanation, Hume’s criticisms entirely lose their bite.
In contrast to the argument from analogy, Dembski sets up the inference to the best explanation as follows:
A. The watch is intricate and well- suited to the task of timekeeping.
W1. The watch is the product of intelligent design.
W2. The watch is the product of random physical processes.
Paley claims that P (A/W1) >>P (A/W2), or that the probability of A given that W1 is the case is much larger than the probability that W2 is the case. The same argument applies to living things.
B. Living things are intricate and well-suited to the task of surviving and reproducing.
L1. Living things are the product of intelligent design.
L2. Living things are the product of random physical processes.
P (B/L1) >> P (B/L2). The likelihood principle states that for a competing set of hypotheses, the one that confers maximum probability on the data is the best explanation. We use this sort of reasoning every day to arrive at proper explanations for the data we encounter. It is my belief that the design argument as an inference to the best explanation is strong, indeed. Next, a third form of the design argument.