Comments on: An Alternative to the Divine Command Theory http://withallyourmind.net/archives/2006/an-alternative-to-the-divine-command-theory/ Wed, 07 Jan 2009 04:54:30 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.6.1 By: Brandon http://withallyourmind.net/archives/2006/an-alternative-to-the-divine-command-theory/#comment-204 Brandon Wed, 29 Mar 2006 20:30:05 +0000 http://withallyourmind.net/?p=165#comment-204 I think that RM Adams is actually fine with saying that “goodness” is independent of God, yet God’s character is such that it exemplifies goodness. If we accept that good is independent of God, are we then gored by the first horn of the Euthyphro dilemma? One response could be to say that God is not constrained by the good but his actions, in virtue of being God, are perfectly good. This response would likely lead to other difficult issues though. Another response would be to say that the dilemma, as stated, unnecessarily conflates morality with goodness. As I see it (and I think this reflects Adam’s theory) when we think of something as having the property of being moral, we think that it entails some sort of normative aspect. However, I don’t see why normativity follows from identifying something simply as being “good.” For instance, if I recognize that doing x is the ultimate good act. Why think that any obligation to do x follows from that recognition? However, if I say that x is the ultimate moral act, then I am saying that I recognize some property of x such that I am obligated to do x. If this distinction is correct, then actions can be good independent of God’s commands, but they are “right” (or ought-to-be-done) because God commands them. (if we understand God as being a loving exemplar of the good who stands in relationship to us in such a way that gives us reason to obey his commands.) You may disagree that good is independent of God, but it seems that we can grant Euthyphro defenders this point and still accept a metaethical theory which grounds morality in God’s commands. I think that RM Adams is actually fine with saying that “goodness” is independent of God, yet God’s character is such that it exemplifies goodness. If we accept that good is independent of God, are we then gored by the first horn of the Euthyphro dilemma? One response could be to say that God is not constrained by the good but his actions, in virtue of being God, are perfectly good. This response would likely lead to other difficult issues though. Another response would be to say that the dilemma, as stated, unnecessarily conflates morality with goodness. As I see it (and I think this reflects Adam’s theory) when we think of something as having the property of being moral, we think that it entails some sort of normative aspect. However, I don’t see why normativity follows from identifying something simply as being “good.” For instance, if I recognize that doing x is the ultimate good act. Why think that any obligation to do x follows from that recognition? However, if I say that x is the ultimate moral act, then I am saying that I recognize some property of x such that I am obligated to do x. If this distinction is correct, then actions can be good independent of God’s commands, but they are “right” (or ought-to-be-done) because God commands them. (if we understand God as being a loving exemplar of the good who stands in relationship to us in such a way that gives us reason to obey his commands.)
You may disagree that good is independent of God, but it seems that we can grant Euthyphro defenders this point and still accept a metaethical theory which grounds morality in God’s commands.

]]> By: Jeremy http://withallyourmind.net/archives/2006/an-alternative-to-the-divine-command-theory/#comment-200 Jeremy Sun, 26 Mar 2006 14:18:31 +0000 http://withallyourmind.net/?p=165#comment-200 Nathan, First of all, thanks so much for the visit and your comments. I hope you come back again. As for your first question, couldn't good just be "a fundamental element of God's nature," I would say yes. This is in fact the common way of answering the dilemma. It really is just taking the second option, but taking away the arbitrariness by asserting that God's nature is such that he could/would only command things that are in fact good. As for whether God's omnipotence means that he can do just anything...there have been some who have advocated what you are suggesting (Descartes seems to have been one), but they are a very small minority. I can see why it seems strange to say that an omnipotent being cannot do something, but I don't think there's any way around it. But upon further thought I think you will see it isn't really that bad. Think about it. A square by definition has four sides, a circle has exactly one side. Does the fact that God can't make something that has exactly one side <i>and at the same time</i> exactly four sides make him any less powerful? I don't think it does. In fact, it seems in some way that if he could, it would make him less perfect. Nathan,
First of all, thanks so much for the visit and your comments. I hope you come back again.
As for your first question, couldn’t good just be “a fundamental element of God’s nature,” I would say yes. This is in fact the common way of answering the dilemma. It really is just taking the second option, but taking away the arbitrariness by asserting that God’s nature is such that he could/would only command things that are in fact good.
As for whether God’s omnipotence means that he can do just anything…there have been some who have advocated what you are suggesting (Descartes seems to have been one), but they are a very small minority. I can see why it seems strange to say that an omnipotent being cannot do something, but I don’t think there’s any way around it. But upon further thought I think you will see it isn’t really that bad. Think about it. A square by definition has four sides, a circle has exactly one side. Does the fact that God can’t make something that has exactly one side and at the same time exactly four sides make him any less powerful? I don’t think it does. In fact, it seems in some way that if he could, it would make him less perfect.

]]> By: Nathan http://withallyourmind.net/archives/2006/an-alternative-to-the-divine-command-theory/#comment-199 Nathan Sun, 26 Mar 2006 10:35:23 +0000 http://withallyourmind.net/?p=165#comment-199 "The basic question is this: Are morally good acts commanded by God because they are good, or are they good because they are commanded by God? It is a dilemma because neither option looks very attractive to the theist. If God commands acts because they are already good, then morality is something that exists independently from God to which even he is accountable. If they are good because God commands them, then they seem arbitrary, and he could, for example, command the torturing of children for fun and it would become good." Does the "then" part of that first statement (the "...acts because they are good..." statement) necessarily follow from the "if" part of it? What if "good" was a fundamental element of God's nature, and he commands things that are aligned with his fundamental nature? (By the way, I think the distinction you noted about inherently moral vs. not inherently moral commands, i.e. dietary laws, is a very reasonable one. The "things commanded" that I talk about here fall into the "inherently moral" catagory) If that were the case, then morality wouldn't be something that existed independently of God, but rather as a fundamental part of his nature. Hmmm. I hope that was all coherent. It's a little late here. One last note: it always seems a little worrisome to say what God couldn't do, if for no reason besides our limited (by definition) perspective. Couldn't God make a square circle, or make 2+2=5? That *would* probably entail God changing the way the universe worked in a fundamental way, but I don't see him not being able to do that just because it is impossible under current "laws of how the universe and existence functions." If we are to honestly say that God is omnipotent, etc., then I think we should be able to accept that he could change fundamental ways in which the universe/existence functions. "and he could, for example, command the torturing of children for fun and it would become good." ...now, yes, something in us revolts against that idea, but we have to understand that we are observing this statement from within our current context of the way God's (presumably) made the universe and existence. But we have to realize that our moral intuitions are determined by that fundamental way in which God made things, and I have to presume that that moral intuition would change along with everything else if God were to decide to turn everything topsy-turvey and change the fundamental rules...which (if I'm to stay consistent with ideas fromt he first part of this ever-lengthening comment) would include, presumably, the fundamental aspects of his nature that dictates those moral rules. Now, I see plenty of reasons that God *wouldn't* do that (potential undoing of all existence?), but I'm not so sure I see a reason that he *can't* do that. I'd like to reitterate the "I hope this is all coherent" comment. Also, this may have all been covered in the paper referenced in the last comment...sorry if this is a repeat in some way. Last thing: I've really enjoyed the conversations I've seen here so far. The world is in great great need of rational thinkers who are willing to be honest and objective in their search for truth, and it seems like some of that is going on here. If so, Congradulations, sir, you have my respect. Please feel free to respond in any way, even if it's "Nope, you're all wrong, here's why." Thanks! “The basic question is this: Are morally good acts commanded by God because they are good, or are they good because they are commanded by God? It is a dilemma because neither option looks very attractive to the theist. If God commands acts because they are already good, then morality is something that exists independently from God to which even he is accountable. If they are good because God commands them, then they seem arbitrary, and he could, for example, command the torturing of children for fun and it would become good.”

Does the “then” part of that first statement (the “…acts because they are good…” statement) necessarily follow from the “if” part of it? What if “good” was a fundamental element of God’s nature, and he commands things that are aligned with his fundamental nature? (By the way, I think the distinction you noted about inherently moral vs. not inherently moral commands, i.e. dietary laws, is a very reasonable one. The “things commanded” that I talk about here fall into the “inherently moral” catagory) If that were the case, then morality wouldn’t be something that existed independently of God, but rather as a fundamental part of his nature.

Hmmm. I hope that was all coherent. It’s a little late here.

One last note: it always seems a little worrisome to say what God couldn’t do, if for no reason besides our limited (by definition) perspective. Couldn’t God make a square circle, or make 2+2=5? That *would* probably entail God changing the way the universe worked in a fundamental way, but I don’t see him not being able to do that just because it is impossible under current “laws of how the universe and existence functions.” If we are to honestly say that God is omnipotent, etc., then I think we should be able to accept that he could change fundamental ways in which the universe/existence functions.

“and he could, for example, command the torturing of children for fun and it would become good.” …now, yes, something in us revolts against that idea, but we have to understand that we are observing this statement from within our current context of the way God’s (presumably) made the universe and existence. But we have to realize that our moral intuitions are determined by that fundamental way in which God made things, and I have to presume that that moral intuition would change along with everything else if God were to decide to turn everything topsy-turvey and change the fundamental rules…which (if I’m to stay consistent with ideas fromt he first part of this ever-lengthening comment) would include, presumably, the fundamental aspects of his nature that dictates those moral rules. Now, I see plenty of reasons that God *wouldn’t* do that (potential undoing of all existence?), but I’m not so sure I see a reason that he *can’t* do that.

I’d like to reitterate the “I hope this is all coherent” comment. Also, this may have all been covered in the paper referenced in the last comment…sorry if this is a repeat in some way.

Last thing: I’ve really enjoyed the conversations I’ve seen here so far. The world is in great great need of rational thinkers who are willing to be honest and objective in their search for truth, and it seems like some of that is going on here. If so, Congradulations, sir, you have my respect.

Please feel free to respond in any way, even if it’s “Nope, you’re all wrong, here’s why.” Thanks!

]]> By: Simon http://withallyourmind.net/archives/2006/an-alternative-to-the-divine-command-theory/#comment-180 Simon Tue, 21 Mar 2006 17:25:27 +0000 http://withallyourmind.net/?p=165#comment-180 Jeremy, this is a very intriguing topic. I think that what you are describing is something like what I've argued for in my series on Divine Nature (http://thinkingdeeply.com/featured/#divine-nature). Specifically, in the 9th article, (http://thinkingdeeply.com/2005/12/27/divine-nature-09/) I make a distinction between Simple Divine Command Theory and Ontological Divine Command Theory, the latter involving that moral oughts are obligations to God in light of His moral commands. This is in following Moreland & Craig in their treatment of the issue in 'Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview'. Jeremy, this is a very intriguing topic. I think that what you are describing is something like what I’ve argued for in my series on Divine Nature (http://thinkingdeeply.com/featured/#divine-nature).

Specifically, in the 9th article, (http://thinkingdeeply.com/2005/12/27/divine-nature-09/) I make a distinction between Simple Divine Command Theory and Ontological Divine Command Theory, the latter involving that moral oughts are obligations to God in light of His moral commands. This is in following Moreland & Craig in their treatment of the issue in ‘Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview’.

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