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Part 7 of a series on miracles.

There seems to be a common thread which is woven throughout all objections to miracles in general, and more specifically to Christ’s miracles and His resurrection: A commitment to methodological and/or philosophical naturalism. Scientists insist that we adopt this stance in the working out of science. Historians, also, in a restatement of Troeltsch’s principle of analogy argue that one must also adopt this view in doing history. Miracles are ruled out a priori. Troeltsch claimed that events of the past must be the same “in kind” as the events of the present if the study of history is possible. In fact, this reasoning destroys genuine historical reasoning since one must be open to the possibility of unique events in the past.

It is perhaps for this reason that C. S. Lewis begins his book, Miracles, with a section on naturalism. Lewis argued for miracles on the basis that one cannot argue for naturalism without his argument self-destructing. Lewis maintained that naturalism undermines reason itself as we would have no good reason to accept our thoughts as having any basis in rationality or truth if they are the products of chance and nature. Second, Lewis affirmed the possibility of miracles on the grounds that there are not good arguments to prove they cannot happen. Third, he maintained that miracles are only improbable if you wrongly oppose supernatural events as conflicting with natural laws. Lewis lastly argued, as have many others, that the miracles of Jesus have a much greater intrinsic probability in view of their connection with each other and their context within Christianity. Moreland and Craig call this the religio-historical context. The convergence of the miracles of the gospels on the person of Christ serves to reinforce their authenticity.

It is reported that Bertrand Russell was asked what reply he would give God if God asked him why he had not believed in Him. Russell said he would say, “Not enough evidence, God, not enough evidence!” Victor Reppert points out that perhaps this would not be God’s fault. We might be inclined to think that God could simply perform some great miracle and earn Russell’s commitment to faith. However, “if the reasoning in David Hume’s epistemological argument against belief in miracles is correct, then no matter how hard God tries, God cannot give Russell an evidentially justified belief in Himself by performing miracles.” It would always be more reasonable to doubt the miracle. It, therefore, would be quite problematic for Russell to complain about the failure of God to provide evidence.

Next, the conclusion.