withallyourmind.net

I posted this one year ago today:

This evening, throughout America, knocking sounds will be heard as children of all sizes will be dressed in their costumes parading through neighborhoods looking for treats. Christian families will be following their consciences as to their degree of participation. A different knocking was heard 488 years ago on this very day, October 31, as a young monk named Martin Luther nailed his “95 Theses” to the door of the church in Wittenberg, Germany (I know it is questioned whether he actually nailed them to the door, but please humor me as it has provided the segue, above.)

Luther’s writing of the “95 Theses” is generally spoken of as the beginning of the protestant reformation. His reason for writing this paper was to contest the abuses of power and errors of the Roman Catholic Church. These theses argue against the selling of indulgences, a fund-raising practice of the church whereby a person can buy their loved-one’s way out of purgatory. Although, Luther had not yet fully developed his gospel of grace, the seeds were contained within this document. He would go on to proclaim that a man is saved by faith alone, and not by works.

For by grace you have been saved through faith. And this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God, not a result of works, so that no one may boast. Ephesians 2:8-9 (ESV)

Today, I celebrate the courage of a man to stand against the world to proclaim the truth of God’s grace. I am daily comforted by the fact that my salvation does not rest on my own works or righteousness. I don’t deserve it. I cannot earn it. I can do nothing to merit it. I am made righteous by Christ’s sacrifice on the cross. That’s it! That is truly something to celebrate. It is the central belief that sets Christianity apart from all world religions. Nothing I do will earn my salvation. My salvation depends on what Christ has done.

But now the righteousness of God has been manifested apart from the law, although the Law and the Prophets bear witness to it— the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ for all who believe. For there is no distinction: for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, and are justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God put forward as a propitiation by his blood, to be received by faith. This was to show God’s righteousness, because in his divine forbearance he had passed over former sins. It was to show his righteousness at the present time, so that he might be just and the justifier of the one who has faith in Jesus. Romans 3:21-26 (ESV)

Michael and Jana Novak, at National Review Online, have written an article concerning a recent book called, Moral Minority: Our Skeptical Founding Fathers. In this book, the authors contend that the founding fathers were less than enthusiastic about the Christian message (at least six of them). I would recommend a reading of the entire Novak article. I thought this quote from a letter which Benjamin Franklin, one of the least orthodox of the top 100 founders, to the president of Yale was interesting:

I believe in one God, creator of the universe. That he governs it by his Providence. That he ought to be worshiped. That the most acceptable service we render to him is doing good to his other children. That the soul of man is immortal, and will be treated with justice in another life respecting its conduct in this. These I take to be the fundamental principles of all sound religion, and I regard them as you do in whatever sect I meet with them.

As to Jesus of Nazareth, my opinion of whom you particularly desire, I think the system of morals, and his religion, as he left them to us, the best the world ever saw, or is likely to see; but I apprehend it has received various corrupting changes, and I have, with most of the present dissenters in England some doubts as to his divinity; tho’ it is a question I do not dogmatize upon, having never studied it, and think it needless to busy myself with it now, when I expect soon an opportunity of knowing the truth with less trouble.

Novak closed the article with this comment:

In sum, the most astonishing thing to say about the religion of the Founders is how little it has been studied during the past hundred years, and how cavalierly and unsympathetically — most often by historians who paint their own portrait while painting in pale colors the faith of their fathers. As a nation of countless students, writers, and professors, surely we can do better than that.

HT: (First Things: Richard John Neuhaus)

I have recently purchased the book, The Quotable Lewis, edited by Wayne Martindale and Jerry Root. I will periodically post random quotes. Today, on human nature.

One of the things that distinguishes man from the other animals is that he wants to know things, wants to find out what reality is like, simply for the sake of knowing. When that desire is completely quenched in anyone, I think he has become something less than human.

- C. S. Lewis, God in the Dock, “Man or Rabbit?” (1946)

Paul Nelson at ID the Future posts on the way the scoreboard works in the intelligent design debate. He asks us to envision walking into an arena where a basketball game is taking place and the scoreboard reads, “60-0″ in favor of the home team. However, as you watch the game, you notice that the visiting team is actually outscoring the home team. The explanation given by a bystander is, “Oh, the visitors can’t possibly win so we don’t bother to count their points!”. This seems like a strange way to play basketball, and it is also a strange way to approach the arguments concerning intelligent design. Unfortunately, this is how the game is often played.

NYU philosopher Thomas Nagel summarizes:

By framing an argument that appears to win in every empirical circumstance — design can’t possibly be true, whatever the evidence — Dawkins misunderstands what is at stake in the debate. Evolution by natural selection can’t win simply by epistemological necessity.

Nelson summarizes his post thusly:

Why do people get nervous before basketball games? Because, if the game is played fairly, the winner will be determined on points, not on definitional tricks. And the underdog might win.

Tom Magnuson, of ID Update, has an excellent post on a response by Richard Dawkins to a question on how consistent he is with his own deterministic worldview. Here is Dawkins’ response:

The philosophical question of determinism is a very difficult question. It’s not one I discuss in this book, indeed in any other book that I’ve ever talked about. Now an extreme determinist, as the questioner says, might say that everything we do, everything we think, everything that we write, has been determined from the beginning of time in which case the very idea of taking credit for anything doesn’t seem to make any sense. Now I don’t actually know what I actually think about that, I haven’t taken up a position about that, it’s not part of my remit to talk about the philosophical issue of determinism. What I do know is that what it feels like to me, and I think to all of us, we don’t feel determined. We feel like blaming people for what they do or giving people the credit for what they do. We feel like admiring people for what they do. None of us ever actually as a matter of fact says, “Oh well he couldn’t help doing it, he was determined by his molecules.” Maybe we should… I sometimes… Um… You probably remember many of you would have seen Fawlty Towers. The episode where Basil where his car won’t start and he gives it fair warning, counts up to three, and then gets out of the car and picks up a tree branch and thrashes it within an edge of his life. Maybe that’s what we all ought to… Maybe the way we laugh at Basil Fawlty, we ought to laugh in the same way at people who blame humans. I mean when we punish people for doing the most horrible murders, maybe the attitude we should take is “Oh they were just determined by their molecules.” It’s stupid to punish them. What we should do is say “This unit has a faulty motherboard which needs to be replaced.” I can’t bring myself to do that. I actually do respond in an emotional way and I blame people, I give people credit, or I might be more charitable and say this individual who has committed murders or child abuse of whatever it is was really abused in his own childhood. And so again I might take a …

The questioner then asked whether Dawkins felt this was inconsistent with his views, to which he replied:

I sort of do. Yes. But it is an inconsistency that we sort of have to live with otherwise life would be intolerable. But it has nothing to do with my views on religion it is an entirely separate issue.

Tom aptly summarized this inconsistency as follows:

Richard Dawkins is a staunch materialist who simply cannot follow his worldview to its logical conclusions. He follows his innate moral intuition, which cannot be explained by material processes, and concedes that he cannot truly live out his worldview.

Michael J. Fox (whose acting I’ve always enjoyed by the way) has been very active in the political campaigns of several democratic office seekers throughout the country. He has participated in press conferences and television commercials urging voters to vote for the democratic candidates on the basis of one issue: embryonic stem cell research. I have just completed a series of blogs on this issue. The focus of this post is to highlight the fallacious nature of Fox’s endeavors. There are two logical fallacies in particular of which one should be aware in viewing his appeals.

The first is the fallacy called ad misericordiam, or the appeal to pity. This fallacy is committed when pity or a related emotion such as sympathy or compassion is appealed to for the sake of getting a conclusion accepted. This is the form of the fallacy:

Person F argues statement p .
F deserves pity because of circumstance y.
Circumstance y is irrelevant to p.
Statement p is true.

I do not intend to cast dispersions upon Fox, nor imply that he is insincere or that he is faking his disease. I fell very badly for Fox and wish him the best. What I am saying is that his suffering due to Parkinson’s disease is irrelevant to the controversy over ESCR. While there is some theoretical potential for stem cell research to treat Parkinson’s disease, there is absolutely no evidence that it will reach this potential. Embryonic stem cells have had no therapeutic success in human so far, while adult stem cells have been used therapeutically in several areas. The real issue is whether or not an embryo is a human being. If not, there should be no restrictions whatsoever on stem cell research. If so, under no circumstances should we sacrifice this innocent human life for the potential benefit of others.

The second fallacy committed is a type of the fallacy called Argumentum ad vericundiam, or the argument from (appeal to) authority. The form of this fallacy is:

A makes claim B;
There is something positive about A,
Therefore claim B is true.

This is the case with almost all celebrity endorsements of one political view or the other. This is actually a subset of the fallacy, argument from authority. It is actually argument from or appeal to celebrity. The fact that Michael J. Fox is a celebrity has no bearing on the actual argument in favor of or against ESCR. The argument must stand without appeals to pity or celebrity.

This is the seventh and final post in a series concerning the ethics of ESCR. I have specifically attempted to evaluate the argument for embryonic stem cell research based on the ethics of scientific naturalism.

At the end of his white paper, Lindsay finally attempts to offer the naturalist’s own theory of moral status:

We maintain that the scope of morality…should presumptively include all beings who are capable of reasoning, and therefore, capable of being influenced by moral norms.

Realizing this leaves out infants, he expands this to the loved ones of the moral community, including children. This still, however, leaves unwanted children outside the realm of moral protection. Apparently, one may do with them what one pleases. Also, on his view, if only mothers could be taught to love embryos, ESCR would suddenly become immoral. Lindsay fails to provide a foundation for moral ethics in approaching ESCR. Not only does he fail in that task, he fails to even provide a basis for making any moral claims from an approach based on scientific naturalism. He fails to make a case that naturalism can account for moral knowledge. Science may inform, perhaps direct, but is not sufficient for making moral judgments.

It is the opinion of this writer that the only firm foundation for ethics and morality is to be found in the Judeo-Christian God, who created man in his own image. Man derives his worth and ethical status on the basis of being made in the image of God. Humans are valuable, not because of anything physical, but because of something innate and immaterial. The fact is that the embryo is a living entity which is genetically distinct from all other human beings and deserves the moral status afforded to all human persons. Scott Klusendorf sums up the issue by claiming that we have…

…violated the principle that once made (us) great: (our) basic commitment to assist the small, weak, and defenseless. It’s regrettable that those espousing tolerance and compassion would treat the most vulnerable members of the human community, human embryos, as disposable instruments to be used for someone else’s benefit. This is not only a serious moral wrong, it is unnecessary. There is no credible evidence that embryonic human beings must lose their lives in order to save ours.

This is the sixth of a series of posts examining Ronald Lindsay’s view on the ethics of embryonic stem cell research as he put forth in a white paper called, Stem Cell Research: An Approach to Bioethics Based on Scientific Naturalism.

Lindsay next deals with the issue of whether embryos are entitled to the same rights as human persons. Even phrasing the question in this way reveals a bias which will influence conclusion. Lindsay starts out assuming that embryos are not human, but only have the capacity to become human.

There are some who believe that embryos deserve the full range of rights provided to human persons and that removing an embryo from that possibility of developing the capacities and properties characteristic of human persons is morally equivalent to killing an adult human.

He “dogmatically” claims to know what makes a human a human. Again, from where did his scientific research give him this knowledge? How does he know this based on metaphysical naturalism? He objects to the view that embryos should be afforded the same moral status as adult human persons. Then, having done so, he claims that “there is no significant moral impediment to embryonic stem cell research.” He holds the view that embryos are to be treated as human persons to be “fundamentally flawed” on the basis of several claims.

First, he argues, it is in tension with accepted scientific understanding of embryonic development. Second, it is based upon a controversial metaphysical position. And, finally, it conflicts with many of our moral judgments and ultimately is unsupported by a credible theory of moral status. Contrary to Lindsay’s claims, present understanding of embryology provides no problem for the view that embryos are human persons. By any objective, scientific standard, the embryo qualifies as a member of the human race. From the moment of conception, the embryo is an individual, distinct from mother, father, and other living things, having her own unique genetic fingerprint. The embryo is living, characterized by metabolism, growth, reaction to stimuli, and reproduction. The embryo is human, carrying DNA with a human genetic signature. Furthermore, regarding his claim that the metaphysical claim that embryos are human persons is controversial, all metaphysical positions are controversial! Lindsay’s own metaphysical position is no less controversial than any other. Given Lindsay’s own commitment to naturalism, one might argue that Lindsay has no access to any real knowledge on morality or whether there are such things as morals.
One of Lindsay’s objections to giving equal moral status to embryos and adult human persons is that the embryo is not an individual. Up until gastrulation, the embryo may undergo a process called “twinning”, in which two separate human persons may be produced. He implies from this process, that an embryo cannot be a human person because then one would have two of the same person. What do we make of this claim? First of all, most embryos do not “twin” and so there is only one embryo present. Second, there is no reason to suppose that twinning undermines the claim that there was at least one individual there from the moment of conception. Lindsay states that the claim that “John” is present from the outset “is nothing more than a dogmatic claim masquerading as fact. There is no scientific evidence to establish the presence of a “John.” Lindsay is looking in the wrong place to establish John’s presence. This is more a metaphysical question than a scientific one. Science cannot tell us whether there is a “John” or not. His appeal to science to find John begs the question as science cannot find something which it is not equipped to find.

Lindsay then objects to the claim that the embryo is equivalent to a human person. He argues:

The possibility that an embryo might develop into a human person does not obviate the fact that it has not yet acquired the capacities and properties of a person. An embryo is no more a human person than an acorn is an oak tree. Not only do embryos lack consciousness and awareness, but they do not have experiences of any kind, even of the most rudimentary sort.

Lindsay seems to define human personhood as having “the capacities and properties of a person”. Once again, I must ask what scientific study gave him this knowledge. I must also ask what scientific study has determined what the capacities and properties of a person are. C. Wayne Mayhill addresses the acorn-oak tree analogy:

Could it be that comparing embryos, or preborns and adults for that matter, to acorns and oaks is dehumanizing and misleading? After all, when an acorn is stepped on, the forest experiences no moral dilemma. When a “toddler” sapling dies the “mother tree” does not weep. We naturally value oak trees more than acorns. Unfortunately, the comparison encourages us to make the quantum leap of concluding we should value bigger and older people more than smaller and younger ones (specifically, the unborn). But what are our reasons for valuing the oak tree over the acorn? They are not moral or humanitarian, but simply pragmatic… Even if the analogy of the embryo to the acorn were accurate, scientifically speaking an acorn is simply a little oak tree, just as an embryo is a little person. Despite the dehumanizing elements of the acorn-oak analogy, those who understand what an acorn is will realize that, ironically, the analogy serves the opposite purpose for which it is intended… Every oak tree was once an acorn. So it is with the person-a person doesn’t simply come from an embryo or a fetus. A person was an embryo and a fetus.

Lindsay then makes the argument that the location of the embryo within a woman’s uterus is of great consequence. It will not develop unless it is provided with the appropriate conditions. The embryo cannot develop on its own. Furthermore, he claims that in the two possible sources of ESC, spare embryos from IVF procedures, and SCNT (somatic cell nuclear transfer), the embryos are removed from that environment and cannot develop into full human persons due to their present conditions. He seems to think this somehow affects the moral status of the embryo. It seems that Lindsay’s argument proves too much. By the same distorted logic, infants and toddlers should not have moral status. A one week infant is totally dependent on others to reach its “potential” so I guess we have no moral obligation to the infant. I can see no rational distinction between the two cases.

Lindsay next claims that there are unacceptable consequences of the view that an embryo is the moral equivalent to an adult human person. It is stated that between 2/3 and 4/5 of all embryos produced through standard sexual reproduction are spontaneously aborted. If these are human persons, he claims this is a horrible tragedy and a public health crisis. He criticizes those who oppose ESCR for not addressing this crisis. He then reasons that this view would also make IVF (in-vitro fertilization) morally objectionable because extra embryos may be discarded. Finally, he argues that because the debate is primarily over federal funding of ESCR and not whether it should be banned, it is obvious that we do not seriously consider the embryo a human person. At most, Lindsay’s arguments would show inconsistency on the part of opponents of ESCR and do nothing to refute the position they hold. However, most opponents of ESCR would not consider any of these consequences an objection to viewing the embryo as a human person. Certainly, they would be in favor of doing all that is scientifically and medically possible to decrease the number of spontaneous abortions. Lindsay fails to mention that it is felt that most of these miscarriages are due to non-viable embryos/fetuses. They are, in a sense, “sick” and therefore “die” like all humans do. Most opponents of ESCR are also opposed to any form of IVF which discards unwanted embryos and are not in favor of producing more embryos than will be implanted. Most serious opponents of ESCR also are in favor of banning the procedure and consider the issue of federal funding a place to argue for their moral beliefs.

Next, concluding the series.

I guess it’s been well over a year now since it happened, but in April of 2005, Greg Koukl and Deepak Chopra had a debate of about half an hour on Lee Strobel’s (since discontinued?) tv show Faith Under Fire. I missed the debate, but heard a lot of good things about it and was pretty disappointed that I missed it and kept hoping it would be re-aired sometime. I know that you can now buy DVDs of the episodes, but as a poor college student I was overjoyed to find out yesterday that the whole thing can be viewed for free on Lee Strobel’s website. (Also, do a search for Koukl and you can watch his entire presentation on Tactics in Defending the Faith, which is a must-see. I’ve downloaded all the parts of both of these to put on a DVD for myself). The videos come in five parts of about 5 to 10 minutes each. For easy reference, here they are (enjoy!):

Part I: http://www.leestrobel.com/videos/Christianity/strobelT1119.htm
Part II: http://www.leestrobel.com/videos/Christianity/strobelT1120.htm
Part III: http://www.leestrobel.com/videos/Christianity/strobelT1121.htm
Part IV: http://www.leestrobel.com/videos/Christianity/strobelT1122.htm
Part V: http://www.leestrobel.com/videos/Christianity/strobelT1123.htm

This is part 5 of a continuing evaluation of Ronald Lindsay’s support for ESCR on the basis of ethics derived from scientific naturalism.

Lindsay’s discussion of the moral implications of ESCR first looks to the possible good which may come from ESCR, and sees this as a moral imperative to pursue this type of research. He claims:

The moral imperative to pursue research with such potentially beneficial consequences seems clear. Alleviation of suffering and restoration of health are important goals even if only one individual is benefited.

If millions might be benefited the moral imperative seems more clear. While most all Americans see the alleviation of suffering as a moral act, it is not clear that this should take precedence as the overarching principle to guide biomedical research. It seems Lindsay is once again positing a utilitarian ethic as the determiner of morality. From a naturalistic perspective, this is perhaps the best one can hope for. Dennis Hollinger states:

Utilitarianism emerged in the nineteenth century as an attempt to establish the field of ethics as a scientific exercise distinct from religion or any worldview commitments. Contrasting their ethical system with the prevailing ‘principle ethics’ of the day, people like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill argued that the foundation for ethics was consequences of a particular kind: namely, the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In this formulation, ethics could actually be quantified and freed from dependence on any prior commitment to ethical norms (such as love, justice, or human dignity) or metaphysical outlooks, including religious ones.

There are several problems in basing our ethical decisions on a utilitarian foundation for ethics. First, it is not at all evident why human happiness for the greatest number of people should be regarded as the final end of human action. Based on an ethic built from scientific naturalism, what scientific experiment established this? Is this just another example of Lindsay’s own dogmatic ramblings, or does he have scientific proof for this ethic? Second, utilitarianism implies that the sought end justifies the means of achieving this end, when obviously some means to obtaining certain “good” goals are suspect. Hollinger points to Thomas Malthus’ justification of dying off large numbers of poor and hungry people for the good end of curbing population growth. Third, utilitarianism assumes objectivity in assessing the greatest good for the greatest number. This objectivity is often found lacking in reality.

Next, are embryos human persons?