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The last of a series on miracles. In case you missed the previous:
Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 Part 4 Part 5 Part 6 Part 7

I close this series with a story told by Daniel Howard Snyder in his article, On Hume’s Philosophical Case Against Miracles. You can reference the whole article (and the whole story, p. 18-21) here. He tells a wonderful story about the Fourth of July Bellingham Salmon Derby in Bellingham, Washington. During the 2001 derby, a world-record 178-pound king salmon was caught, weighed, and witnessed by all twelve judges and many other onlookers. Unfortunately, after the final weighing it slipped back into the water and swam away. Afterwards, the city council notified the Guiness Foundation, publisher of the Guiness Book of World Record, of the catch, sending an affidavit signed by all judges. The Guiness Foundation replied that they could not accept the claim on the ground of insufficient evidence. When asked what further evidence would be necessary, the Foundation essentially responded that no amount of proof would be sufficient on the following basis: All previous attested caught king salmon have weighed less than 178-pounds. So, all king salmon that are caught weigh less than 178-pounds. So, Mr. Kont did not catch a 178 pound king salmon. Their proof was based on infallible universal experience.

This is exactly the sort of question-begging approach many take with regards to the historicity of Christ’s miracles. Given the existence of the Christian God, we have no good reason to doubt the possibility of miracles, and are obligated to examine the claims of miracles with the same objectivity with which we examine all historical claims.

In this series, while not answering the question of whether Jesus’ miracles are fact or fiction, I have asserted that one must not simply dismiss those claims as fiction on the basis of the impossibility of miracles. When one surrenders his naturalistic bias, he finds good reason to believe the historicity of the miracles of Christ, especially the miracle of His resurrection. In conclusion, I quote William Lane Craig:

“…the presupposition of the impossibility of miracles should, contrary to the assumption of nineteenth and for the most part twentieth century biblical criticism, play no role in determining the historicity of any event. While many scholars still operate under such an assumption, there seems now to be a growing recognition that such a presupposition is illegitimate. The presupposition against the possibility of miracles survives in theology only as a hangover from an earlier Deist age and ought to be once for all abandoned.”

O Death, Death, He is come.
O grounds of Hell make room.
Who came from further than the stars
Now comes as low beneath.
Thy Ribbed ports, O Death
Make wide; and Thou, O Lord of Sin,
Lay open thine estates.
Lift up your heads, O Gates;
Be ye lift up, ye everlasting doors
The King of Glory will come in.

I just came across what appears to be a very innovative and helpful website: www.leestrobel.com. Of course, this is a website by Lee Strobel, author of multiple books on Christian Apologetics, including The Case for Christ and The Case for the Creator. The site is full of video clips and other resources for those who have a desire to investigate the claims of Christianity. (HT: Mark D Roberts)

Part 7 of a series on miracles.

There seems to be a common thread which is woven throughout all objections to miracles in general, and more specifically to Christ’s miracles and His resurrection: A commitment to methodological and/or philosophical naturalism. Scientists insist that we adopt this stance in the working out of science. Historians, also, in a restatement of Troeltsch’s principle of analogy argue that one must also adopt this view in doing history. Miracles are ruled out a priori. Troeltsch claimed that events of the past must be the same “in kind” as the events of the present if the study of history is possible. In fact, this reasoning destroys genuine historical reasoning since one must be open to the possibility of unique events in the past.

It is perhaps for this reason that C. S. Lewis begins his book, Miracles, with a section on naturalism. Lewis argued for miracles on the basis that one cannot argue for naturalism without his argument self-destructing. Lewis maintained that naturalism undermines reason itself as we would have no good reason to accept our thoughts as having any basis in rationality or truth if they are the products of chance and nature. Second, Lewis affirmed the possibility of miracles on the grounds that there are not good arguments to prove they cannot happen. Third, he maintained that miracles are only improbable if you wrongly oppose supernatural events as conflicting with natural laws. Lewis lastly argued, as have many others, that the miracles of Jesus have a much greater intrinsic probability in view of their connection with each other and their context within Christianity. Moreland and Craig call this the religio-historical context. The convergence of the miracles of the gospels on the person of Christ serves to reinforce their authenticity.

It is reported that Bertrand Russell was asked what reply he would give God if God asked him why he had not believed in Him. Russell said he would say, “Not enough evidence, God, not enough evidence!” Victor Reppert points out that perhaps this would not be God’s fault. We might be inclined to think that God could simply perform some great miracle and earn Russell’s commitment to faith. However, “if the reasoning in David Hume’s epistemological argument against belief in miracles is correct, then no matter how hard God tries, God cannot give Russell an evidentially justified belief in Himself by performing miracles.” It would always be more reasonable to doubt the miracle. It, therefore, would be quite problematic for Russell to complain about the failure of God to provide evidence.

Next, the conclusion.

Always interested in good explanations of the relationship of faith and reason, I found a post by Mark Roberts on some DaVinci Code diaglogue interesting. Here is some of what he said:

Robert Langdon’s view of faith has a measure of truth in it. Faith includes accepting as true that which we cannot definitively prove. I cannot prove, for example, that Jesus died on the cross for my sins, though I certainly believe it. From a historical point of view it’s highly likely that Jesus was crucified, but the “for my sins” part obviously goes beyond the historical facts, even though there are plenty of biblically-based arguments for the atoning significance of Jesus’s death.

Here we see a good example of the nature of Christian faith. It is based on the facts, but goes beyond them. It is not believing fabrications, however. If it turned out that Jesus really didn’t die on a cross, and that this had been made up by the early Christians for some crazy reason, then Christian faith would be in vain. No matter how much allegory or metaphor might be present in the crucifixion of Jesus, if it didn’t actually happen, then we are still in our sins.

I suppose some people might argue, as does Robert Langdon, that even this sort of error-based faith has value if it helps people live better lives. But this is not an orthodox Christian perspective. Nor is it a Jewish one, for that matter. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, people trust God in light of God’s activity in the past and in response to His revelation. Faith is based on facts, even though it goes beyond them. Faith is not limited to what can be demonstrated by reason, though it is reasonable and can be defended with rational arguments.

Part 6 of a series on miracles

So, how does one responde to Hume’s objection to miracles (see last post)? First, Thomas Sherlock, in reply to another’s attack on miracles, states that if testimony is only admitted when a matter is deemed possible based on our own conception, then many facts must be discarded. For example, a man living in the tropics would be right in stating that water can never exist in a solid state. It seems Hume’s argument proves too much.

Willian Lane Craig argues that Hume’s “in principle” argument seems question-begging or mistaken. To say that uniform experience is that miracles do not occur is to assume that the miracle in question did not occur. If one grants the possibility of God’s existence, then it is equally possible that God has acted supernaturally at some point in history. Then, Craig argues, it is a matter of evidence, not of principle, to determine if the event occurred.

Moreland and Craig also argue that Hume fails to account for all the probabilities involved in assessing whether a miracle has taken place. For example, it is extraordinarily improbable that I will win the lottery today. If the newspaper, whose accuracy in reporting is 99.99%, reports tomorrow that I won the lottery, I would have to judge that occurrence as not happening since the probability of the paper reporting an error is greater than the probability that I won the lottery. Of course, this is absurd. Two other considerations must be dealth with, as well. First, one must also account for the probability that if the event did not occur, the testimony would be the same. Second, one must also account for the substantial increase in probability that arises from multiple, independent testimony to some event.

Once miracles are allowed “in principle”, Hume’s “in fact” argument does nothing but to perhaps make us cautious in assessing whether a miracle has occurred. It will be a matter of evidence as to whether an opposing claim is better attested than a claim to a miracle of Jesus.

Next, a commitment to naturalism.

Part 5 of a series on miracles.

David Hume’s argument against miracles is perhaps the most famous and is considered by many to have settled the question concerning the possibility of miracles. Hume, at least, felt that he had settled the issue once and for all:

“I flatter myself that I have discovered an argument…which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently will be useful as long as the world endures.”

William Lane Craig divides his argument into two prongs: his “in principle” argument and his “in fact” argument. In principle, he argues against the identification of any event as a miracle, and then states what he thinks is, in fact, the case.

1. In principle, a wise person will proportion his belief based on the evidence. Hume believed it was always more rational to believe that a mistake or deception has been made than to believe someone’s testimony that a miracle has transpired. The uniform experience of man stands against the testimony of any individual that a miracle has occurred. For example, our universal experience tells us that dead men don’t rise. Therefore, it is always more rational to believe the testimony of many than the testimony of the one.

2. In fact, the evidence for miracles is very poor. There are at least four reasons why this is so. First, no miracle is attested by a sufficient number of men of good sense, education, and integrity. Second, people crave the miraculous and will believe all sorts of absurd stories. Third, miracles only occur among barbarous people. Fourth, all religions have their own miracles and therefore cancel each other out in that they support contradictory doctrines.

Victor Reppert explains Hume’s argument succinctly:

“The first step is an argument for the claim that the antecedent probability of an event’s occurrence diminishes the credibility of testimony to it. That is, we must not only consider the credibility of the testifier, but also the antecedent probability of that which is testified to. The second step in Hume’s argument is a defense of his claim that the miraculous nature of a purported event makes its antecedent probability as small as could possibly be imagined; that any combination of natural events, however antecedently improbable, is antecedently more probable than a scenario involving supernatural intervention. If this argument is successful, then Hume has successfully impugned the rationality of anyone (including millions of Christians who believe in the resurrection of Jesus) who believes that a miracle has occurred.”

So, for Spinoza, the laws of nature are universal and immutable; therefore a miracle is actually impossible. For Hume, the experience of humans is uniform, therefore miracles are incredible.

Next, an answer to Hume.

Two things I’ve read serve as the impetus for this post. One I read yesterday. Al Mohler posted an excellent blog, “A New Exodus? Americans are Exiting Liberal Churches. He was commenting on Dave Shiflett’s new book, Exodus: Why Americans are Fleeing Liberal Churches for Conservative Christianity. While many conservative churches are experiencing growth, many liberal groups are witnessing a declining membership. Here’s an excerpt:

Citing a study published in 2000 by the Glenmary Research Center, Shiflett reports that the Presbyterian Church USA declined by 11.6 percent over the previous decade, while the United Methodist Church lost “only” 6.7 percent and the Episcopal Church lost 5.3 percent. The United Church of Christ was abandoned by 14.8 percent of its members, while the American Baptist Churches USA were reduced by 5.7 percent.

On the other side of the theological divide, most conservative denominations are growing. The conservative Presbyterian Church in America [PCA] grew 42.4 percent in the same decade that the more liberal Presbyterian denomination lost 11.6 percent of its members. Other conservative denominations experiencing significant growth included the Christian Missionary Alliance (21.8 percent), the Evangelical Free Church (57.2 percent), the Assemblies of God (18.5 percent), and the Southern Baptist Convention (five percent).

As quoted in Exodus, Glenmary director Ken Sanchagrin told the New York Times that he was “astounded to see that by and large the growing churches are those that we ordinarily call conservative. And when I looked at those that were declining, most were moderate or liberal churches. And the more liberal the denomination, by most people’s definition, the more they were losing.”

Today, I read a USA Today article, “God and gays: Churchgoers stand divided”. I found it interesting that the headline spoke of divided opinions, yet only the pro-homosexual lifestyle opinion was voiced. Several prominent advocates of accepting homosexuality in churches were heard from, but no dissenting opinions were presented. In this excerpt, churches are encouraged to change their stance on homosexuality or continue losing members:

Rogers wonders whether churches can afford the wait, particularly when some, such as the Presbyterian and Episcopal churches, are losing members at a rate of 40,000 a year, he says.
“Young adults today can’t understand what the fuss is all about. Their lives are colorblind. They have gay friends and straight friends. They have good values, but they don’t stay with the church,” he says.
“The gay-rights battle isn’t the main reason, but it’s one of them. They don’t see in their church a lens to see the world.”
And people of all ages “are really tired of all this” fighting.
“Most people just want to get on with thinking about Jesus.”

Obviously, these folks just don’t get it. It is the liberal churches which are losing members because their message is a tepid, watered-down revision of Christ’s message. Here are a few USA Today comments from Barbara Brown Taylor, ex-Episcopal priest:

“the whole purpose of the Bible … to convince people to set the written word down in order to become living words in the world for God’s sake. Jesus knew the Hebrew Scriptures, and he departed from them. He was not faithful to the Scripture of that time, and today the Bible teaches me the book is not the final authority. … The spirit is moving; Scripture is not the only measure.” (The clergy should talk about) “the virtues of righteous sexual relationships of any kind and bless them.”

Mohler concluded his post with this anecdote from the book:

In this case, seminarian Andy Ferguson, who had questioned the anti-supernaturalistic claims of his seminary professors, was confronted by a fellow seminary student who said, “We’ve been talking about you. We know you’re having a rough time, and we’ve finally figured out what your problem is . . . . You’re the only one here who believes in God.” Andy Ferguson decided that his fellow student was right. “They believed in things like the redemptive power of the universe, but I was the last one there who wanted to defend the biblical God–the God who makes claims on us, who said we should do some things and not do others, and who put each one of us here for a purpose.”

In the end, Andy Ferguson left the liberal seminary, converted to Catholicism, and went into the business world. He told Dave Shiflett that liberal Protestantism is doomed. “Mainline Protestantism will reach a certain point where it will appeal only to Wiccans, vegetarians, sandal-wearers, and people who play the recorder. No one will feel at home there if they believe in God.”

Part 4 of a series on miracles.

One historical philosopher who has argued against miracles is Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677), a Jewish philosopher. Norman Geisler summarizes Spinoza’s argument as follows:

1. Miracles are violations of natural laws.
2. Natural laws are immutable.
3. It is impossible for immutable laws to be violated.
4. Therefore, miracles are impossible.

As Geisler points out, the second premise is the crucial one for the argument. For Spinoza, the laws of nature flow from the necessity of the divine nature. Spinoza held to a sort of pantheistic view of nature. Therefore, to state that God does something contrary to the laws of nature is to say that God does something contrary to His own nature, therefore, a contradiction. He argued that the belief in miracles, rather than confirming God’s existence, actually undermined our confidence in God and led to skepticism.

For Spinoza, the laws of nature are universal and immutable; therefore a miracle is actually impossible. However, There is no compelling reason to accept his assumption that the laws of nature are universal and immutable. I would once again refer to Howard-Snyder’s discussion of natural laws as prescriptive versus descriptive. In either case, there is no good reason to exclude miracles. If they are prescriptive, there must be a prescriber who can repeal and replace as he thinks fit. If descriptive, they must include what actually happens, whether natural or supernatural. Spinoza’s pantheistic system is one where nature and God are interchangeable terms. In such a system, a violation of nature would be a violation of God’s being. However, the question for us is not whether miracles are possible from a pantheistic perspective, but rather from one that is at least open to theism. Spinoza’s objection that miracles, rather than acting as a confirmation of God’s existence, would undermine our belief in God carries weight only if one holds a naturalistic or deistic world view.

Glory to thee, my God, this night,
for all the blessings of the light:
keep me, O keep me, King of kings,
beneath thine own almighty wings.

Forgive me, Lord, for thy dear Son,
the ill that I this day have done;
that with the world, myself, and thee,
I, ere I sleep, at peace may be.

Teach me to live, that I may dread
the grave as little as my bed;
teach me to die, that so I may
rise glorious at the awful day.

O may my soul on thee repose,
and with sweet sleep mine eyelids close;
sleep that shall me more vigorous make
to serve my God when I awake.

When in the night I sleepless lie,
my soul with heavenly thoughts supply;
let no ill dreams disturb my rest,
no powers of darkness me molest.

Praise God, from whom all blessings flow;
praise him, all creatures here below;
praise him above, ye heavenly host:
praise Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.