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I love the analogy offered by William Dembski in The Design Revolution. He asks us to imagine that…

it is January 1971 and you are at Orchestra Hall in Chicago listening to Rubinstein perform. As you listen to him perform Liszt’s Hungarian Rhapsody no. 2 in C-sharp Minor, you think to yourself, “I know the man I’m listening to right now is a wonderful musician. But there’s an outside possibility that he doesn’t know the first thing about music and is just banging away at the piano haphazardly.” The fact that Liszt’s Hungarian Rhapsody is cascading from Rubinstein’s fingers would thus merely be a happy accident.

Liszt’s Hungarian Rhapsody is an example of specified complexity. Most folks would not listen to Rubenstein and conclude that he is “just a lucky imbecile banging away at a keyboard in just such a way as to coincidentally give the appearance of a man” playing an elaborate piece of music. Most would rightfully conclude that there was an intelligence which caused those notes to be produced in the particuarly pattern in which they were.

Dembski, in this particular chapter of the book, is discussing the loophole Darwinists try to escape through when denying specified complexity points to a designer: That of an infinite universe or even infinite numbers of infinite universes. He calls this the inflationary fallacy, which attempts to rescue chance by invoking probabalistic resources from outside the known universe.

He argues that unlimited probabilistic resources ensure that we can never know whether an event is occuring by chance or by design. We have no rational basis for doing so. Given enough probability, anything can happen. However, if we confine ourselves to the known probabilistic resources for our finite universe, we can confidently infer that certain events are not the result of chance, but the result of intelligent design.

It is possible that I have intelligently typed this blog with the intent to communicate a message, but, given unlimited probabilistic resources, I probably just got very lucky.

    In Part I of my brief series on issues of interest in the philosophy of mind, I gave a modal argument for substance dualism by appealing to the conceivability of being disembodied or having a different body. In this post, I’d like to look at a central aspect of consciousness and show why many philosophers don’t believe it can be reduced to the physical.
    Phenomenological properties, now most commonly known as qualia, are “what it’s like” properties. What I mean by this is that for each of our sensory experiences there is a “what it’s like” quality. For example, seeing a red rose in bloom has a distinct sensory quality that is quite different from that of seeing a yellow sunflower. Similarly, the smell of gasoline has a quality that is different from smelling a bar of Dove soap and the caress of a loved one feels quite different than the prick of a pin. It is these distinctive “what it’s like” properties that philosophers refer to when they speak of phenomenal consciousness or qualia.
    Many philosophical arguments have been given in recent years that such properties cannot be physical properties and they have convinced even some of the most die-hard physicalists to admit the reality of at least some things that are outside the physical domain (See the earlier discussion of Jaegwon Kim’s latest book). This first is called the knowledge argument and can be summarized in this way:

Suppose it is sometime in the future, say 2560 and there is at this time a surgical operation that can fix colorblindness. Suppose furthermore that there is a prominent scientist who is in her 40s and is colorblind and is yet to recieve this operation (let’s call her Martha). Martha, it just so happens, studies physics and neuroscience and in fact knows everything there is to know about the physics and and physiology of seeing, for example, the color red. She can describe in complete physical detail everything that happens when light reflects off of a red object, interacts with the eyes, optic nerves, brain, etc. Suppose that she then gets the operation to cure her colorblindness and the first thing she comes across when taking the bandage off of her eyes is a red object. Does she learn anything new at that point? It seems obvious that she would, namely, what it is like to see a red object. But we already assumed that she knew all the physical facts about what it is to see red. Therefore, there must be some facts that go beyond the physical.

    Thomas Nagel famously argued that this is because some facts can only be captured from a “subjective perspective,” which don’t play any role in the objectivity of science. For example, we can know everything there is to know about a bat from the objective perspective and still be missing factual information. Even if we know to the most minute detail everything physical that goes on in a bat’s sonar system, we will still be missing something, namely, what it’s like to perceive an object using sonar.
    Another famous argument is David Chalmer’s zombie argument. Physicalists have long held to the supervenience of the mental on the physical. This means that for any mental state M, there is a physical state P such that M supervenes on P and that if any x is in M x is alo in P and vice versa. This has usually been portrayed as a necessary connection, but Chalmers argues that it is not. For, he says, it is conceivable (and therefore probably possible) that there is a zombie world that is physically indiscernible from our own but in which no one has phenomenal consciousness.
    If this is true, what it means is that there is no necessary connection between physical states and (phenomenal) mental states and physicalists are not only left with something outside of the physical, but something that leaves a large explanatory gap. Why is it that when I am pricked with a pin I feel a pain rather than a tickle? Why is it that an apple tastes sweet instead of sour? If these can not be reduced to anything physical, then it seems no scientific explanation of them can be given . Some philosophers have used this point to argue that a personal, non-physical explanation must be given (A.K.A. God - see Robert M. Adams’s Flavors, Colors, and God).
    Although these arguments do not prove substance dualism I do believe that they have implications for it (which I will perhaps spell out later). What is more important is that they show fundamental problems with any strictly materialist philosophy of the mind, something that I think Christians should be happy about.

A few days ago, I listened to NPR and heard a conversation with our former president Jimmy Carter. It is with some embarassment that I remember my first use of my right to vote, which came shortly after I turned 18 in 1976. At that time, I thought little (or at least superficially) about values and morality. I voted for Jimmy Carter! Why? Because he was a fellow Georgian (I was born in Atlanta).

I was not enthralled with what I heard Mr. Carter say in this NPR interview. My intention was to blog about it. However, this is about the extent of my blog, because I just read Albert Mohler say everything I would want to say and more. You should read his post about Carter and his new book Our Endangered Values: America’s Moral Crisis. Carter blames most of America’s problems on conservative Christians and those who disagree with his more liberal theology. As Mohler states, we all agree our values are endangered. The difference of opinion concerns what those values are, and what is endangering them.

I was reading the LA Times article discussing the Pennsylvania court trial on Intelligent Design which has just concluded. The following story, excerpted from the article, raises an important consideration to anyone who wishes to convince others of the falsity of certain beliefs and the veracity of others:

As he (Behe) walked down the courthouse steps, journalists and documentary filmmakers surrounded him. One in particular peppered him with tough questions.

“Why do you demonize Darwin?” he asked. “Why can’t you leave Darwin alone?”

Behe tried, and failed, to convince the journalist that he was only challenging a scientific theory. He was astonished to learn later that the questioner, writer and filmmaker Matthew Chapman, was Charles Darwin’s great-grandson.

It is often the case that those with whom we argue have emotional reasons for not wanting to accept your line of reasoning. Granted, it is not often that we encounter a family member of a famous person who was responsible for the development of the argument we are countering.

People, however, have a great deal invested in their beliefs. Many have spent almost their entire lives within a community of people who hold those beliefs dearly. Those people find it difficult to grant a fair hearing to any opposing viewpoints because there is emotional baggage which must be cast aside in order to let go of old beliefs and embrace new ones.

I have personally witnessed the struggle of individuals who turn their backs on the comfort of their present surroundings to embrace truth. The LA Times article points out the price that Dr. Behe has paid in challenging Darwinism. His own university has a formal statement distancing themselves from his beliefs. It talks of how he has tried and failed to get research grants and how scientific journals have rejected his articles. Behe states that his colleagues think he “went bad”. It is sad that one often encurs separation and persecution and must leave behind much of what he has enjoyed in the past in order to follow truth.

The take home point is that we must recognize that good arguments will not ensure acceptance of that for which we argue. A person must be willing to lay down the emotional baggage in order to accept truth. It’s not surprising that Darwin’s great-grandson might find it more difficult to embrace ID than others. How to reach those people? Well, one may help that person see that there are other reasons that they are having difficulty with your viewpoint than the rational support (or lack thereof) for the viewpoint, itself. And, one may pray that God will help them (and us all) to love truth enough to embrace it regardless of cost and loss of comfort.

Of course, no one wishes to be thought of as intolerant. According to modern society, however, any person who believes that there are moral absolutes is considered intolerant. Obviously, evangelical Christians are among the most intolerant people in America. Fortunately, Dr. J. Budziszewski, in his 1999 book, The Revenge of Conscience, offered three maxims to assist in the retraining of the intolerant:

“The more ideas and behaviors you are able to tolerate, the more tolerant you are.”
“The more you doubt, the more tolerant you are.”
“Keep your convictions to yourself.”

Tolerance used to mean recognizing and respecting the rights of others to hold viewpoints and opinions different from yours. It now means the willingness to accept other’s views as correct or true, even if they contradict your own. So, if one wishes to be labeled tolerant he must hold no strong convictions of his own. If this is not possible, one must always keep his views to himself.

This type of tolerance is, in itself, most intolerant by its own standards. The only viewpoint tolerated is the belief that there are no moral absolutes. One cannot hold the viewpoint that certain things are true, and others are not…that certain actions are immoral, and others are not. The appeal for “tolerance” is really an appeal for moral relativism. I guess this blog just means I’m…intolerant.

Alber Mohler’s recent blog concerns Bishop Gene Robinson, the first openly homosexual bishop of the Episcopal Church USA, who was elected to lead the diocese of New Hampshire in 2003. The bishop comments on his homosexuality to The Guardian, a London paper:

It is not something of which I should repent and I have no intention of doing so. I have been led to understand that I am loved by God just as I am. That is not to say I am perfect but it is my belief that my orientation is value-neutral. It is what I do with my relationship that God really cares about.

I know I should no longer be astonished at reading such comments, as they are so commonplace in today’s society, but I cannot help but shake my head in incredulity each time I hear such talk, especially from someone who is supposed to represent the Christian faith. His further comments, as pointed out by Albert Mohler, shed light on how one can hold such an opinion.

We worship a living God, not one locked up in the Scripture of 2,000 years ago.

I have discussed with homosexuals the scriptural teachings on the subject of homosexuality. I have also discussed those teachings with non-homosexuals interested in what the Bible says. Scripture’s condemnation of a homosexual lifestyle is straightforward and clear. Bishop Robinson’s view of scripture reveals how one may feel justified being openly gay. His view of the authority of scripture is quite low… if it has any real authority at all. Scripture is made to accomodate whatever choices one makes. Although a topic for a different blog, his characterization of God and the Bible reminds me of what I hear in the emergent church.

I believe the bishop is right when he states that God loves him. However, being loved by God does not justify one’s actions or lifestyles. God manifests his love for us so that we might glorify him and live moral, godly lives. A parent may love a child, but not approve of the choices he makes. By choosing wrongly, he does not forfeit his parent’s love. It is a grave misunderstanding to reduce God to a being who loves everyone as they are and tolerates any kind of behavior. We err if we forget about God’s righteousness and holiness, and his hatred of sin.

He believes his orientation is value-neutral. As Mohler remarks, it certainly wasn’t the Bible that led him to believe that. What does Robinson mean when he says that it is what he does with his relationship that really matters? Are all sexual practices value-neutral? Group relationships? Incest? It appears that his view of scripture and Christianity allows virtually any behavior as long as one feels good about it.

This amorality is not derived from the Bible, but from the influences of a secular world. It is post-modernistic thought dressed up in religious clothing. I pray Bishop Robinson will allow God’s love to lead him to repentance.

    Since I’ve been doing a lot of independent study in philosophy of mind this semester I thought I’d dedicate a few posts to giving some of the philosophical arguments used to support the (usual and I would say biblical) Christian conception of the body and soul as two distinct substances (A.K.A. substance dualism). Perhaps in a later post I will give more details as to the exact relation of the soul to the body (perhaps much later since I have no clear opinion on this matter yet), but for now let’s just jump into the arguments to think that they are indeed two distinct things. This first one, which may be called a modal argument for dualism, will be expressed in outline form followed by a brief defense of each premise. It takes the form of reductio ad absurdum.
The Argument
 (1.) For any x if x=y, then x=y in every possible world (that is, x is necessarily identical to y).
 (2.) Suppose I am identical with this body of mine.
 (3.) Therefore, I am identical with this body of mine in every possible world (that is, I am necessarily identical with this body of mine).
 (4.) But it is not the case that I am identical with this body of mine in every possible world.
 (5.) Therefore, I am not identical with this body of mine (at all).
Defense of the Premises
 (1.) This is, as far as I know, a universally accepted principle sometimes called the necessity of identities that can be derived from Leibniz’ law that if x=y then x has all the same properties as y. See Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity.
 (2.) Assumption for the sake of the reductio.
 (3.) This just follows from (1) and (2) by Modus Ponens.
 (4.) This is the key premise to the argument and can be defended various ways. JP Moreland, in Body and Soul, seems to favor using the conceivability of disembodied existence as evidence for premise four. He argues that any person who is a Christian would seemingly be committed to the possibility (and the actuality) of disembodied souls in light of New Testament teaching. In addition to this, there have been numerous reports of out-of-body experiences and whether or not one thinks these have actually happened, there doesn’t seem to be anything inconceivable about them happening. That is, their reports seem at least possible but this would not be the case if a person was identical to his/her body. Richard Swinburne also offers the possibility of disembodied existence as evidence for (4), but goes on to include the possibility of body-switching. He argues that there is certainly a possible world where he could wake up one morning and find that he and his wife have switched bodies (Swinburne’s example is slightly different, but this captures the gist of it). The upshot is that if either of these two strategies work, and there is even one possible world where I exist without a body or with a body different than the one I now have, then I am not identical with my body.
 (5.) This is negation of the supposition in (2) after a contradiction from (3) and (4) has been derived.

    It would seem that this gives us a pretty strong argument that we are not identical to our bodies or any individual part of our bodies or even any physical thing. What is essential to us seems to be therefore completely immaterial. It is this immaterial something that we call the soul.
    What is unfortunate is that few philosophers grapple with the strength of this argument and instead say the magic words “interaction problem” (which I will address later) and pretend the argument has disappeared or appeal to an a priori principle that any argument (or person) that posits immaterial substances must be absurd.

[Edit: It has been brought to my attention that I didn't say anything about the link between coneivability and possibility. I must admit that there is some debate about the entailment of possibility from conceivability, but the fact is that conceivability is the way that we usually figure out whether or not something is possible, and although it is not infallible, it seems that the fact that one can positively conceive something and reflect on it without seeing contradiction is strong evidence that it is possible. Indeed, it is hard to see how any other test for possibility could be given. For a very long article about this matter (which I have not yet read), see Chalmers' Does Conceivability Entail Possibility. Maverick Philosopher also had a discussion about this over at his blog a little while ago.]

Stand to Reason today has a funny story for “problem thinkers”. I encourage all thinkers to read it.

I was reading William A Dembski’s, The Design Revolution, and was struck by an important point he makes. He asks why do we even need to use the word “intelligent” before “design”? Isn’t this redundant? Doesn’t design imply intelligence? The reason proposed is to differentiate intelligent design from two other frequent uses of the word: apparent design and optimal design.

Apparent design is not actual design. It just appears this way. Richard Dawkins began The Blind Watchmaker with these words:

Biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.

So, apparent design negates intelligent design; it is pure Darwinism.

Dembski then addresses optimal design. Optimal design is a strawman constructed to attempt refutation of intelligent design. Opponents of ID identify optimal design as “perfect design that is best with respect to every possible criterion of optimization”. In other words, if an organism (or the world for that matter) exhibits what we would construe to be flaws, it cannot be designed. Dembski states:

Since actual designs always involve tradeoffs and compromise, such globally-optimal-in-every-respect designs cannot exist except in an idealized realm…(a “Platonic heaven”) far removed from the actual designs of the world.

He points out that by assigning all design as either apparent or optimal, critics avoid the central question of whether there is actually design in biological systems regardless of what other attributes they may possess (e.g. optimality). Critics of ID often suggest, says, Dembski, that any purported cosmic designer would only design optimally. But this is not a scientific question, but a theological one.

This discussion does bring to mind an objection often offered against theistic belief: That a good and all-powerful God would not have made a world which manifests so much evil and heartache. Briefly, one answer concerns whether God could have made a world without evil and tragedy. The world may not appear optimal from our vantage point, but we may not fully understand the goals of the designer. One could argue that for free will to exist, men must have the capability of doing evil. Perhaps, out of all the worlds God could have designed, this one is optimal to accomplish his goals. He certainly could have made one without free will which would have looked less messy. But in order to attain certain objectives, other, less desirable consequences must be tolerated.

I received a question from a good friend in response to my recent post of 10/31 on Luther and the “95 Theses”. His question dealt with the question of what role works play in the life of a Christian. Certainly, this is a complex question on which many books have been written. A protestant distinctive is the belief in sola fide: Justification by Faith Alone. Wikipedia summarizes it thusly:

Sola fide asserts that, although all people have disobeyed God’s commands, God declares those people obedient who place their confidence, their faith, in what God has done through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. They account Christ’s obedience as their own, and the only meritorious, obedience. Their assurance is that God’s work in Christ is their commendation for acceptance by God. Conversely, the doctrine says that those who trust God in this way do not trust what they themselves have done (which has no worth, because of sin). The doctrine holds that it is not through personal goodness that sinners are reconciled to God. Reconciliation is only through the mercy of God himself, made effectual for forgiveness through the sacrifice of his son; thus it is only through the obedience of Christ given in substitute for the disobedience of believers, who for their sake was raised from the dead, that they have confidence that they are in fact heirs of eternal life.

Certainly, there is a link between belief and works. The Epistle of James loudly proclaims this truth. The question is, “Am I saved by faith alone, or by faith plus works”? If my works enter into the equation, I might as well forget about it. What I do or do not do has no effect on my salvation. And if it does, I am lost.

I can have confidence in my salvation only insomuch as it rests on the rightousness of Jesus Christ. In the words of Isaiah, “we are all as an unclean thing, and all our righteousnesses are as filthy rags” (Isaiah 64:6 KJV). Notice, it is not our sins which are as filthy rags, it is our righteousnesses!

This is not to say that a Christian life is devoid of good works. Quite the contrary! A Christian life should be full of good works. It would be hard to imagine a Christian, who has no good works. They flow naturally out of a life filled with the Spirit. However, if we ever begin to think that our works merit any of God’s favor, we are sorely mistaken.

Galatians 2:16
Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law: for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified

Galatians 2:21
I do not frustrate the grace of God: for if righteousness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain.

In the words of a famous hymn:

My hope is built on nothing less
Than Jesus’ blood and righteousness.
I dare not trust the sweetest frame,
But wholly trust in Jesus’ Name.

When He shall come with trumpet sound,
Oh may I then in Him be found.
Dressed in His righteousness alone,
Faultless to stand before the throne

On Christ the solid Rock I stand,
All other ground is sinking sand;
All other ground is sinking sand.